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ABSTRACT 
 
This three-essay dissertation addresses two central research questions: (1) ‘how do firms defend 
themselves when targeted by social movement activists?’ and (2) ‘why do firms respond 
differently to activists’ demands?’ Essay 1 is a single-case study of Royal Dutch/Shell’s 
rhetorical responses to anti-apartheid activists’ demands for the firm to divest from, or sever its 
ties to, South Africa in the late 1980s. Building on the findings from the first essay, Essay 2 is an 
examination of Coca-Cola, Inc.’s covert, or secret, funding of a front group that intended to 
defame the audiences (e.g., social activists, legislators) putting anti-soda pressures on the firm in 
the early 2000s. I address the second research question in Essay 3. Specifically, I develop and 
test theory regarding the factors that influenced American firms’ differential responses to anti-
apartheid activists’ pressures for divestment from South Africa in the late 1980s. This 
dissertation contributes to the academic literature in the following ways. Essays 1 and 2 are the 
first examinations of defamation as a plausible strategy in firms “defensive repertoire” when they 
are targeted by external audiences such as social activists and legislators. Essay 3 is the first 
study to show that differences in firms’ substantive commitments to marginalized or repressed 
stakeholders in a host country influence the divestment decision. Overall, this dissertation offers 
new insight into the ways firms defend themselves as well as the factors that influence firms’ 
differential responses to social movement activism. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms often engage in contentious interactions with social movement activists due to conflicting 
ideologies regarding issues such as labor, the environment, and corporate operations abroad (de 
Bakker et al., 2013). Activists employ coercive tactics such as boycotts and protests to change 
contested corporate practices and policies. Social movement tactics generally result in damage to 
corporate reputation (King, 2008a), financial loss (King & Soule, 2007), and threats to 
organizational legitimacy (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Waldron, Navis, & Fisher, 2013). 
Scholars have theorized corporate responses to activism, which range from acquiescence to 
resistance (Spar & La Mure, 2003).  
 Although research to date has primarily emphasized corporate acquiescence to activists’ 
demands, majority of activist events are unable to change corporate behavior (King, 2008a). This 
reality has led to calls for research on firms’ decisions not give in to activists’ demands (Baron, 
2003; Soule, 2012a; Weber & King, 2014). This dissertation is an emphatic response to these 
calls. This dissertation focuses on two central research questions: (1) ‘how do firms defend 
themselves when targeted by social movement activists?’ and (2) ‘why do firms respond 
differently to activists’ demands?’ These questions have attracted some scholarly attention 
(Briscoe & Gupta, 2016), and I seek to contribute to this topic.  
 To address the first research question, I build on the work of scholars who emphasize 
firms’ use of rhetorical impression management strategies to defend themselves (e.g., McDonnell 
& King, 2013). Impression management is defined as organizational attempts to “create, 
maintain, protect, or otherwise alter an image held by a target audience” (Bolino, Kacmar, 
Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008: 1080). In Essay 1, I analyze Royal Dutch/Shell’s responses to anti-
apartheid activists’ pressures to divest from South Africa between 1986 and 1990. Royal 
		 2 
Dutch/Shell confronted an international boycott for its refusal to divest from South Africa 
despite the systematic racial segregation in the country. Archival sources detailing the 
interactions between Shell and anti-apartheid activists offer insight into the firm’s attempts to 
delegitimize activists. More specifically, Shell’s spokespersons aimed to show shareholders and 
consumers that the organizations associated with the international boycott were (a) largely 
rejected by Black leaders in South Africa and (b) supporters of “terrorism” (i.e., violence) 
against the firm. This essay shows that firms use character attacks to simultaneously delegitimize 
activists and legitimize firms’ controversial practices. 
 In Essay 2, I examine an indirect mechanism by which firms defame, or seek to damage 
the reputation of, individuals and organizations putting pressures on firms. Specifically, I 
investigate firms’ covert, or secret, funding of front groups—organizations that claim to 
represent a civil society agenda, but primarily seek to defend corporate interests—in response to 
external audiences, such as social movement activists. Research on front groups primarily 
emphasizes their role in firms’ lobbying efforts (Lyon & Maxwell, 2004; Walker, 2014), but I 
argue that some front groups may be used to defame the audiences that criticize firms. 
Empirically, I compare the rhetoric of Coca-Cola and the Center for Consumer Freedom (CCF), 
a front group that Coca-Cola covertly funded in response to the anti-soda movement between 
2001 and 2005. I find that while Coca-Cola publicly portrayed itself as a socially responsible 
organization that could help reduce obesity in the U.S., Coca-Cola simultaneously funded the 
CCF to defame the external audiences that pressured the firm to change its products. This essay 
reveals firms’ hidden agendas to delegitimize external audiences while striving to maintain a 
positive image in society.  
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 Whereas Essays 1 and 2 address how firms defend themselves in response to social 
movement activism, Essay 3 addresses the second question of ‘why firms respond differently to 
activists’ demands?’ As Essay 1 highlights, firms often confront activism for operating in host 
countries that are known for human rights violations. Using the context of apartheid in South 
Africa, I examine the factors that influenced U.S. firms’ decisions to divest from or maintain 
economic ties to South Africa, in the midst of activists’ demands for divestment. Specifically, I 
develop and test theory regarding two relevant factors: (1) corporate activism in the host country 
and (2) the sanctions, or financial penalties, of subnational (e.g., state-level) governments in 
firms’ home countries. I find that firms with the highest levels of corporate activism remained in 
South Africa, whereas state-level sanctions against firms prompted divestment.  
 Overall, this dissertation offers insight into new ways by which firms defend themselves 
against social movement activists as well as the factors that influence differential responses to 
activists. I offer more details about these findings in each essay of the dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 2: FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE: ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL’S RESPONSES 
TO ANTI-APARTHEID DIVESTMENT PRESSURES, 1986-1990 
 
Abstract 
 
I investigate how firms defend their organizational legitimacy in response to social movement 
activism. Building upon organizational impression management (OIM) research, I focus on 
firms’ rhetorical strategies to delegitimize activists. Empirically, I analyze Royal Dutch/Shell’s 
responses to anti-apartheid activists’ pressures to divest from South Africa between 1986 and 
1990. This case study offers insight into two broad rhetorical strategies: (1) portrayal of activists’ 
logic for solving social issues as specious (i.e., flawed, illogical) and (2) character attacks. This 
paper contributes to a more complete understanding of firms’ responses to social movement 
activism by moving beyond self-focused OIM strategies to other-focused OIM strategies. 
 
Keywords  
Organizational impression management, social movements, organizational legitimacy, rhetorical 
legitimation 
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Introduction 
Research at the nexus of organizations and social movements is primarily concerned with 
contentious interactions between firms and activists (de Bakker, den Hond, King, & Weber, 
2013; den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Soule, 2012a). Social movement activists often seek to 
change controversial corporate behaviors, including environmental degradation, unfair 
workplace practices, and business operations in politically unstable host countries (Briscoe & 
Gupta, 2016). Activists use defamatory rhetoric (e.g., ‘naming and shaming’) to delegitimize 
firms (Bartley & Child, 2014). Defamatory rhetoric, in connection with protests and boycotts, is 
positively linked to firms’ acquiescence to activists’ pressures (e.g., Soule, Swaminathan, & 
Tihanyi, 2014). Yet, prior research on the outcomes of social movement activism has largely 
ignored the prevalence of activists’ unsuccessful attempts at changing corporate behavior (Baron, 
2003). As a result, “we still know little about the larger questions of how organizations [such as 
firms] defend their positions when disparaged by social movement challengers” (McDonnell & 
King, 2013: 388). Thus, this inquiry is critical to a full understanding of contentious firm—
activist interactions.   
In this paper, I address the following research question: How do firms defend their 
legitimacy when pressured by social movement activists? To address this question, I build upon 
prior research in organizational impression management (OIM)—defined as organizational 
attempts to “create, maintain, protect, or otherwise alter an image held by a target audience” 
(Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008: 1080). Organizations often implement rhetorical 
impression management strategies to protect or defend their legitimacy, or perceptions that the 
organization’s actions are socially appropriate (Suchman, 1995). Recently, OIM has become 
relevant for understanding firms’ responses to activists. For example, firms make prosocial 
		 6 
claims of their community engagements in response to activists’ boycotts (McDonnell & King, 
2013). Conversely, firms may deny wrongdoing following a controversial event when activists 
threaten their legitimacy (Benoit, 2014).  
 Although most OIM strategies offer information about the focal firm (i.e., self-focused 
OIM), firms also present information about others in order to legitimize the firm (i.e., other-
focused OIM). In particular, the delegitimization of, or negative rhetoric against, activists 
represents an understudied other-focused OIM strategy. With regard to firm—activist 
interactions, scholars consider delegitimization to be a salient activist strategy (Bartley & Child, 
2014). Despite recognition that firms often engage in social movement-like strategies in response 
to activism (e.g., Kramer, Whiteman, & Banerjee, 2013), scholars have not considered 
delegitimization as a potential firm-level response. In this paper, I examine this response and 
show how firms can ‘fight fire with fire’ to defend their legitimacy. 
Empirically, I analyze an historical case of a firm’s attempts to delegitimize social 
movement activists. Between 1986 and 1990, activists engaged in an international boycott 
against Royal Dutch/Shell for its operations in apartheid South Africa. Apartheid—the 
systematic segregation of whites and the non-white majority—sparked a global social movement 
to pressure firms’ divestment, or exit, from the country (Thompson, 2000). Despite being the 
target of a boycott across 15 countries, Shell remained in South Africa. Using a unique set of 
archival documents that detail the interactions between activists and Shell’s executives in South 
Africa, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States, I uncover two salient 
rhetorical strategies of delegitimization. 
The rest of the paper proceeds in the following manner. The next section reviews 
literature concerning firms’ responses to activists’ pressures, with a particular emphasis on the 
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use of impression management strategies. Then, I discuss the international boycott of Shell 
during apartheid. Afterwards, I present the methods employed in the study and an analysis of 
Shell’s responses to the boycott. I conclude with scholarly implications and suggestions for 
future research. 
Firms’ Responses to Activists’ Pressures 
Firms’ responses to activists’ pressures vary along a continuum of acquiescence to resistance 
(Oliver, 1991; Spar & La Mure, 2003). Extant research largely focuses on the factors that 
influence corporate acquiescence (e.g., Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Luders, 2006; King, 2008a; 
Soule, 2009). In particular, the defamation associated with boycotts and protests challenges the 
legitimacy of firms as socially responsible actors (Bartley & Child, 2011, 2014; den Hond & de 
Bakker, 2007; Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004). Threats to organizational legitimacy can 
result in corporate acquiescence to activists’ pressures (Soule et al., 2014). Despite the prevailing 
emphasis on corporate acquiescence in the extant literature, most activist events are unsuccessful 
in changing corporate behavior (Baron, 2003). King (2008) acknowledges that upwards of 70% 
of activist boycotts do not result in a corporate change. Firms either ignore activists’ pressures or 
strategically defend themselves (McDonnell, 2016). To better understand how firms defend 
themselves, I draw upon OIM research. 
OIM and Firms’ Responses to Activists’ Pressures 
Impression management theory is concerned with how individuals and organizations present 
themselves and others to target audiences (Bolino et al., 2008; Goffman, 1959). Like individuals, 
organizations typically aim to present positive images of themselves. OIM strategies are 
classified as either self- or other-focused and proactive or reactive (Mohammed et al., 1999). 
Self-focused OIM strategies present information about the focal organization’s accomplishments, 
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abilities, or disassociation with a controversial practice. Conversely, other-focused OIM 
strategies serve to enhance or protect a focal organization’s legitimacy by managing information 
about others (Cialdini, 1989). Proactive OIM strategies serve to enhance an organization’s 
legitimacy without being prompted by target audiences, whereas reactive strategies are defensive 
in nature and are implemented in response to threats to organizational legitimacy (Bolino et al., 
2008). Organizations often use spokespersons, such as employees or public relations consultants, 
to communicate these strategies (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992).  
 With regard to firm—activist interactions, an OIM lens is primarily used to show how 
firms implement self-focused reactive strategies following controversial events or actions. Some 
firms acknowledge their wrongdoing when pressured by social movement activists in order to 
restore legitimacy, as evidenced by Timberland’s response to allegations that the firm destroyed 
Amazon rain forests and contributed to global warming (Swartz, 2010). More broadly, firms 
make prosocial claims about their engagement in social and community initiatives as a way to 
deflect activists’ threats to firms’ legitimacy (Kraemer et al., 2013; McDonnell & King, 2013).  
In contrast, research on firms’ use of other-focused strategies in response to activism is 
largely non-existent. McDonnell (2016) provides an exception in her study of firms’ sponsorship 
of activists’ initiatives as a reaction to activists’ pressures. Firms increase their legitimacy by 
sponsoring, or proclaiming a positive link to a favorable other, such as an activist organization 
(Mohamed et al., 1999). Yet, extant OIM research concludes that firms can also increase their 
legitimacy by portraying others in a negative manner (Mohamed & Gardner, 2004). Specifically, 
intentional or unintentional delegitimization of others can deflect attention away from the focal 
firm and present it in a favorable manner. In the context of firm—activist interactions, 
delegitimization is a plausible response to activists’ pressures. Firms often adopt activists’ 
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strategies, which include delegitimization (Bartley & Child, 2014). I argue that firms’ rhetoric of 
delegitimization represents other-focused OIM that serves to defend firms’ legitimacy when they 
confront activists’ pressures. In the remainder of this essay, I examine this rhetorical strategy 
using the case of Royal Dutch/Shell’s responses to anti-apartheid activists.  
The International Boycott of Royal Dutch/Shell 
Foreign Divestment and Apartheid 
To begin, it is important to note that the international boycott against Shell represented a sub-
movement within the broader anti-apartheid movement. Between 1948 and 1994, apartheid—the 
systematic segregation of whites and the nonwhite majority—was the law in South Africa. The 
ruling National Party justified apartheid on scientific and religious grounds, claiming a biological 
and moral inferiority of black South Africans to white Afrikaners. More than 100 apartheid laws 
exerted rigid control over blacks in forms such as land displacement, unequal access to 
education, and high rates of solitary confinement (Thompson, 2000). Countrywide states of 
emergency stemming from social unrest and local anti-apartheid resistance led to a series of 
detentions and political killings of black activists by the South African police in the late 1980s. 
Deemed as a “crime against humanity” (Morton, 2000: 27), apartheid sparked a global social 
movement against the National Party and its supporters. 
In addition to the global community placing economic and cultural sanctions on South 
Africa, anti-apartheid activists pressured firms to divest from the country. Activists argued that 
financial contributions of firms to the government, in the form of taxes and loans, maintained the 
apartheid status quo (Smith, 1977). Thus, activists targeted firms to achieve the broader objective 
of removing the incumbent government and ending apartheid (Soule, 2012b). In total, more than 
550 foreign firms publicly divested from South Africa between 1985 and 1990 due to global 
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anti-apartheid pressure, escalating violence, and political instability in the country (Cooper, 
1991). Each divestment was a success for the global anti-apartheid movement as it showed that 
activism could influence corporate change. General Motors and Barclays Bank’s divestments in 
1986, in particular, were key victories for activists given that these firms initially adopted 
resistant stances. These victories gave activists confidence in their pursuit of forcing Royal 
Dutch/Shell to divest, such that one activist exclaimed, “1986 was the year of Barclays, 1987 
will be the year of Shell” (Shell UK, 1987a). 
Targeting Royal Dutch/Shell 
Shell’s presence in South Africa dates back to 1902. By the mid-1980s, Shell operated more than 
800 petrol stations throughout the country, engaged in oil refinery, supported coal-to-oil 
conversion, and employed more than 2,500 workers (Shell South Africa, 1988). Activists argued 
that oil supplied by Shell was directly used in military and police vehicles in the repression of 
black South Africans (Klinghoffer, 1989). This argument, coupled with Shell’s visibility as the 
largest firm in the world and leader in the South African oil industry, made Shell an easy target 
for anti-apartheid activists. On January 9, 1986, the AFL-CIO and the Free South Africa 
Movement, two coalitions of unions and anti-apartheid organizations across the United States, 
launched an international boycott of Shell for its operations in the country. In a joint statement, 
leaders of these organizations stated that the sole objective of the boycott was to “encourage 
Shell to disinvest [from] South Africa as a part of the broad effort to pressure the South African 
regime to end the apartheid system” (Shipping Research Bureau, 1986). Although anti-apartheid 
campaigns against individual firms were not new (e.g., Mobil Oil in the US; Barclays Bank in 
the UK), this boycott was unique in that Shell was the only firm to confront a global activist 
campaign. 
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By 1988, activists in fifteen countries predominantly spanning North America and 
Europe joined the boycott. Led by Timothy Smith, the Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility (ICCR)—a coalition of faith-based institutional investors—spearheaded the 
boycott in the US. Similarly, the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) UK served as a hub for 
AAM affiliate organizations across Europe. These two prominent organizations led the 
international boycott and defamed Shell for its operations in South Africa. Activists labeled Shell 
as a “partner in apartheid” in their leafleting and letter writing campaigns. In addition to leaflets 
and letters, activists took to international news and radio outlets to voice their demand for Shell’s 
divestment. In the U.S., for example, radio jockeys embarked on a ‘Shell Discredit Card’ 
campaign to create awareness of the firm’s operations in South Africa. Consumers could cut up 
their Shell credit cards and receive a ‘discredit card’ as a symbol in support of Shell’s 
divestment. Activists assumed that, like many of its corporate peers, Shell would bow to these 
pressures and divest. This assumption was grounded in the fact that the international boycott 
damaged Shell economically and socially within its first year. 
Although Shell’s sales decreased in the UK, US, and Denmark (Shipping Research 
Bureau, 1988) and the activist demand was relatively cheap to address (i.e., Shell’s $400 million 
investment in South Africa represented one percent of its global assets), Shell did not acquiesce. 
Critics argued that Shell remained in South Africa to profit at the expense of black South 
Africans (Field, 2010), whereas supporters argued that the morally responsible decision was to 
stay (Jones & Reavis, 2013). Although the true rationale for Shell’s decision to stay in South 
Africa remains subject to debate, my focus is on how Shell responded to the international 
boycott.  
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The time period selected for this study is 1986 to 1990. Activists launched the 
international boycott of Royal/Dutch Shell in January 1986, and the firm experienced an 
escalation of pressure to divest in the subsequent years. By 1990, however, South Africa’s 
sociopolitical climate had changed, signaled by the election of a new president (F.W. de Klerk) 
and the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. These changes paralleled the 
decline in pressure enacted upon Shell. Furthermore, foreign divestment nearly halted by 1991 as 
several firms began consideration of re-entry strategies. 
Methodology 
Despite Shell’s corporate archives being closed to researchers, I obtained many of Shell’s 
corporate documents from the ICCR and AAM-UK’s archives, housed at Columbia University 
and Oxford University, respectively. These documents include letters, memos, and speeches 
generated by executives at Shell’s headquarters (i.e., Shell International) and subsidiary locations 
in response to activists’ pressures. In total, I obtained 77 corporate documents from the two 
archives. These Shell-generated documents were complemented by 91 activist-generated 
documents that defamed Shell given the firm’s decision to remain in South Africa. 
In addition to the archival data, I interviewed and engaged in a series of email 
correspondences with a former director at Shell International who oversaw the South African 
case. Brent Johnson served in various assignments for nearly 30 years at Shell before serving as 
the liaison between Shell South Africa and Shell International.1 He offered insight into Shell’s 
rhetorical responses to anti-apartheid activists. I also gathered 200 articles from global 
newspapers to obtain a sense of the media’s portrayal of Shell’s responses during the time 
period. Keyword searches included “Shell” and “apartheid,” “South Africa,” and “international 
boycott.” Finally, I obtained secondary sources that addressed the interaction between Shell and 																																																								
1 Pseudonym provided. 
2 Emphasis added. 
3 Although Pepsico, Inc. also confronted anti-soda pressures, we do not include an analysis of PepsiCo’s responses 
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activists. A recent corporate volume of Shell’s history, for example, discusses the firm’s 
response to the international boycott (Luiten van Zanden et al., 2007). Additionally, a video 
documentary of the global anti-apartheid movement, Have You Heard from Johannesburg? 
(Field, 2010), contains Ger Wagner’s (CEO of Shell Holland) reflections of global activism 
against Shell. 
Data Analysis 
The data analysis occurred in three phases, following established norms for document analysis 
(Bowen, 2009). First, I labeled each document according to its author, target audience(s), and 
emergent theme(s). Authors included senior-level executives at Shell International and 
subsidiaries as well as public relations consultants hired by Shell to better understand local 
activism in particular countries (e.g., hiring Pagan International in the US). Target audiences 
included Shell’s employees, anti-apartheid activist organizations, the media, and consumers. I 
identified several emergent themes within the archival documents, including (a) Shell’s denial of 
activists’ allegations that the firm was a ‘partner in apartheid’; (b) Shell’s parallel anti-apartheid 
rhetoric; (c) Shell’s arguments for the role of business in South Africa’s sociopolitical reform; 
and (d) Shell’s criticisms of anti-apartheid activists. I interpreted Shell’s rhetoric as a desire to 
defend its legitimacy against activists’ defamation. 
Second, I compared the emergent themes with the extant literature to better understand 
established rhetorical strategies for defending firms’ legitimacy (Eisenhardt, 1989). I follow 
others who have used an OIM perspective to understand how firms defend themselves against 
activists. Relevant OIM strategies included prosocial claims of Shell’s activities in local 
communities, denials that Shell supplied oil to the apartheid government, claims of 
exemplification (i.e., that Shell was a highly reputable employer in South Africa), and 
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delegitimization of anti-apartheid organizations that defamed Shell and its subsidiaries. In most 
cases, each document contained multiple OIM strategies. Although Shell implemented a variety 
of OIM strategies, I focus on the firm’s use of delegitimization in order to advance a theoretical 
foundation for this strategy, specifically, and firms’ use of other-focused OIM strategies in 
response to activists, more broadly. 
Third, I re-coded the documents for all instances of delegitimization. First-order codes 
during this stage of analysis included ‘terrorism,’ ‘pro-apartheid support,’ ‘faulty divestment 
logic,’ and ‘distortion of facts’ among others (see Table 1). A research assistant independently 
coded a randomized sample of 35 documents (~21% of the total documents) to establish 
confidence in the analysis. The intercoder reliability was 0.81, higher than the established 
standard of 0.70 (Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000). Coding differences were resolved by discussion 
and mutual agreement. This phase of coding produced three categories of rhetoric. Then, axial 
coding, or the process of comparing categories with one another and defining their properties 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998), reduced the number of categories to two. Shell’s rhetoric of 
delegitimization is categorized as (1) portrayal of activists’ logic for solving social issues as 
specious (i.e., flawed, illogical) and (2) character attacks. In the next section, I present my 
analysis of these responses. 
Portrayal of Activists’ Logic as Specious 
Between 1986 and 1990, Shell’s spokespersons and anti-apartheid activists debated about the 
best means to end apartheid. Spokespersons argued that by staying in South Africa, Shell could 
pressure the government and effect a sociopolitical change leading to the end of apartheid. In a 
letter to the ICCR soon after the boycott started, Shell International President Lo van Wachem 
remarked, “we believe that within South Africa, Shell has been at the forefront of the campaign 
		 15 
by business to bring about significant political change” (van Wachem, 1986). Despite Shell’s 
anti-apartheid and corporate reform stances, activists equated Shell’s decision to remain in South 
Africa as a partnership with the apartheid government. For example, Rich Trumka, President of 
the United Mine Workers Association, stated 
“Royal Dutch/Shell’s supply of oil to the South African government is a strategic pillar in 
supporting the apartheid regime. Without the support of Royal Dutch/Shell and other 
large transnational corporations, apartheid would collapse” (01/22/1986).  
 
Anti-apartheid activists maintained this position for the entirety of the international boycott, as 
evidenced by their leaflets and letters claiming ‘Shell fuels apartheid’ and ‘Shell supports the 
enslavement of Black South Africans.’ Activists intended for this defamatory rhetoric to 
delegitimize Shell and reduce consumers’ support for the firm.  
 Shell countered activists’ defamatory rhetoric with responses of delegitimization. The 
portrayal of activists’ logic for solving social issues as specious, or illogical, was the first 
rhetorical strategy of delegitimization. Such logic does not lead to desired conclusions—in this 
case, the end of apartheid and improved well-being for the nonwhite majority in South Africa. 
First, Shell’s spokespersons portrayed activists’ divestment logic as specious by arguing that 
divestment was beneficial to the apartheid system. Spokespersons considered proponents of 
divestment as apartheid supporters. Richard Longfield, manager of Government Relations at 
Shell International, argued, 
“Indeed, they [activists] appear to be more in line on this issue with those supporters of 
apartheid in South Africa who welcome disinvestment as a means of strengthening and 
expanding local ownership at bargain prices, while getting rid of strong internal critics of 
apartheid” (05/06/1987). 
 
In many cases, firms divested and sold their assets to local white businessmen who supported the 
apartheid government (Sethi & Williams, 2000). Shell’s spokespersons viewed divestment as a 
way for firms to ‘wash their hands’ of the apartheid problem and implicitly support the goals of 
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local businessmen. For example, spokespersons cited the General Motors case, in which “the 
new owners of the business have announced that they will no longer be observing the Sullivan 
Principles”—a US initiative designed to promote equality and reform in the workplace (Shell 
International, 1987). Many apartheid supporters were opposed to the Sullivan Principles, as the 
principles entailed economic and social advancement of the nonwhite majority (Adler, 1989). 
Hence, new business owners sought to remove such initiatives from the workplace. In essence, 
Shell’s spokespersons portrayed activists’ logic of divestment as specious in that divestment 
aligned with the goals of businessmen who supported apartheid—and by extension, the 
government itself. 
 This rhetoric paralleled activists’ defamatory rhetoric of Shell being a partner in 
apartheid. Shell’s spokespersons often used this rhetoric in public forums, such as annual general 
meetings, and in its leaflets given to consumers. Shell intended to persuade the general public 
that activist organizations, such as the ICCR and AAM, helped facilitate apartheid by supporting 
a corporate strategy favored by many white businessmen in South Africa. Spokespersons argued 
that rather than quicken the pace of ending apartheid, divestment gave apartheid supporters what 
they wanted—a reduction in the number of corporate critics of apartheid and the ability to 
purchase businesses at a low cost. By staying in South Africa rather than divesting, Shell’s 
spokespersons presented the firm as a staunch opponent of the apartheid system rather than an 
implicit supporter of it. 
Second, spokespersons portrayed activists’ logic of divestment as specious by claiming 
that divestment resulted in negative consequences for the nonwhite majority in South Africa. 
Activists often passed out leaflets to consumers that accused Shell of “taking advantage of 
apartheid’s slave labor conditions” (AFL-CIO, 1986). According to activists, Shell’s presence in 
		 17 
South Africa resulted in job loss in countries such as the UK, Netherlands, and US. In response 
to this defamatory rhetoric, Shell’s spokespersons contended that divestment would exacerbate 
the problems for nonwhite South Africans. In his annual address, Shell South Africa president 
John Wilson stated 
“The unfortunate fact, though, is that the effect of sanctions and disinvestment could well 
be the opposite of what is intended. They are likely to lead only to further repression, 
further suffering, benefitting most those whom they are aimed at harming, and harming 
most those whom they are aimed at aiding” (December 1986). 
 
The ‘harm’ that John Wilson referred to included the removal of initiatives meant to benefit 
nonwhite employees in the workplace and the reduction in philanthropic aid to nonwhite 
communities. These types of statements implied that activists’ arguments in favor of divestment 
equated to a lack of concern for the well-being of the nonwhite majority. 
 Third, Shell’s spokespersons portrayed activists’ logic of divestment as specious by 
proclaiming that nonwhite South Africans desired for firms like Shell to remain in the country. 
Spokespersons often cited surveys and polls of South Africans regarding firms’ divestment 
decisions. For example, in an address to shareholders at an annual general meeting in the 
Netherlands, Shell President Lo van Wachem remarked 
“Not only have they [activists] picked the wrong target, they are pursuing a strategy 
which is increasingly rejected by the black community. For instance, a recent survey 
carried out by a responsible independent organization showed that the majority of blacks 
opposed economic sanctions, but what is even more striking is than an even bigger 
majority said that foreign companies should stay in South Africa. This is the latest in a 
string of polls conveying this message” (05.11.1989). 
 
 van Wachem’s remarks indicate a debate among South Africans regarding the presence or 
absence of foreign firms in South Africa. Although he did not cite specific statistics, he asserts 
that the majority of Black South Africans were in favor of firms staying in South Africa. Global 
media sources confirm his assertion as a government-commissioned opinion survey of 4,500 
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Blacks in South Africa found “very little” black support for divestment of foreign firms (Herald, 
1987). Similarly, Cowell (1986) confirms that in earlier polls, most black South Africans 
opposed divestment.  
 In addition to polls and surveys, Shell’s spokespersons often quoted Black leaders who 
were opposed to divestment or acknowledged a need for foreign firms’ economic support in the 
eventual sociopolitical transition. Black leaders included religious leaders, such as Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, and political leaders who oversaw South African homelands. In early 1987, top 
management team members at Shell’s British subsidiary published a report entitled ‘Shell in 
South Africa’ and claimed 
The advocates of disinvestment are vocal, but some of the leading figures in the struggle 
against apartheid inside the country do not agree with them (January 1987).  
 
This claim suggests that a segment of Black leadership supported the continued role of foreign 
firms in South Africa. This support was in stark contrast to activists’ claims that Black leaders 
welcomed divestment. Similarly, in direct response to an ICCR letter demanding Shell’s 
divestment, Public Affairs Coordinator R.W. Tookey remarked 
“We are encouraged by the February 1990 pastoral letter from the Synod of Bishops led 
by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. I quote one paragraph… “The Metropolitan has indicated 
that he would then be willing to…urge a massive re-investment in a new South Africa." 
The last sentence clearly recognizes that South Africa requires foreign investment for its 
development” (06.27.1990). 
 
R.W. Tookey’s use of a direct quote from Archbishop Desmond Tutu implied that Tutu’s stance 
shifted from being in favor of Shell’s divestment near the beginning of the international boycott 
to being in favor of firms like Shell having a role in the country’s sociopolitical transition. 
Moreover, Tookey’s remarks suggested that activists who pressured Shell to divest had lost the 
support of a central figure in South Africa.  
Character Attacks 
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In addition to portraying activists’ logic as specious, character attacks represented another way 
Shell’s spokespersons delegitimized activists. Specifically, spokespersons criticized violence 
associated with the movement and accused activists’ of spreading false information about Shell’s 
operations in South Africa. First, spokespersons labeled small activist organizations affiliated 
with the movement as “terrorists” who engaged in violent behavior. In a media interview 
regarding his views on the international boycott, South Africa President John Wilson remarked, 
“Terrorists…you cannot talk to them. People who set fire to gasoline pumps and cut hoses are 
irrational” (1988). Similarly, in my correspondence with Brent Johnson, he labeled anti-apartheid 
activists that set fire to Shell gas stations as “terrorists.” Shell’s spokespersons referred to the 
destruction and vandalism of Shell’s property, primarily in the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Sweden. By the end of the boycott, small activist groups committed over 1,000 acts of 
destruction or vandalism, 800 of which were serious nature (e.g., cut gas hoses, burned down gas 
stations). 
 Spokespersons claimed that larger anti-apartheid organizations supported these actions. 
In response to a letter from the World Council of Churches (WCC) calling for Shell’s 
divestment, van Wachem remarked 
“Your intention to withdraw support for the boycott if we leave South Africa implies that 
the WCC reserves to itself a right to impose or withdraw public penalties on companies 
for behavior measured against standards as defined by the WCC unilaterally. I cannot 
help feeling that such an attitude contributes to a climate in which certain people feel 
violence is justified” (09/24/1988).  
 
Although larger activist organizations such as the WCC and AAM publicly condemned acts of 
violence against Shell, spokespersons equated support for the firm’s divestment as support for 
any actions against the firm, including violence. Spokespersons’ use of media outlets and public 
forums critiquing the association between groups engaged in violence and larger organizations 
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aimed to dissuade individuals (e.g., consumers) from joining or supporting an international 
boycott linked to “terrorism.”  
 Second, Shell’s spokespersons accused activists of spreading false information about the 
firm. In their leaflets and protests, activists alleged that Shell supplied oil to the South African 
government. In addition to denying these allegations, Shell’s spokespersons responded with 
rhetoric that questioned the integrity of activists. For example, in a letter to all Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) of Shell subsidiaries, Lo van Wachem stated, 
“…they [activists] are repeatedly using false or misleading information and making 
unfounded allegations. To give but one example which is particularly pernicious: the 
impression is being widely fostered that the South African police and military are 
dependent on Shell for their oil product supplies and that Shell is somehow responsible 
for their actions. This is untrue” (09/23/1986). 
 
Given stipulations of South Africa’s Petroleum Product Act of 1985, oil companies could not 
release the names of suppliers and sources of origin for oil (Klinghoffer, 1989). Thus, activists 
could not confirm whether Shell had a direct role in supplying oil to the country. Shell’s 
spokespersons aimed to characterize activists as deceptive in their rhetoric, which was meant to 
attract potential supporters for the boycott.  
 Outside of Shell’s operations in South Africa, activists criticized the firm’s use of public 
relations consultants in response to the boycott. In particular, Shell USA hired Pagan 
International to assist it with better understanding the organizations associated with the activist 
campaign in the United States. In 1987, Timothy Smith, director of the ICCR, obtained a copy of 
Pagan International’s proposed recommendations to Shell USA. Timothy Smith considered these 
recommendations as a way for Shell to undermine the campaign as Pagan International was 
regarded as a “boycott buster” based on its previous work for firms. He took this issue to the 
media and sent letters to executives at Shell USA and Pagan International. Shell’s spokespersons 
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countered this criticism by noting the legality of hiring a public relations firm. Additionally, they 
suggested that Timothy Smith misconstrued Shell’s attempts of working with organizations 
associated with the campaign as a means to jointly resolve the apartheid issue. For instance, in a 
letter to the Justice and Peace Office, which supported Timothy Smith’s accusations, Phillip 
Carroll of Shell USA stated, 
“On at least three occasions, we publicly discussed with the news media our use of Pagan 
to help respond to those who consistently misrepresent our position and that of the Royal 
Dutch/Shell company. The characterization of the Pagan proposal is just another example 
of this same type of misrepresentation” (10/08/1987). 
 
Similarly, Rafeal Pagan, the CEO of Pagan International, responded to the ICCR in an open 
letter with remarks such as, 
“We are not convinced of the rightness nor impressed with the reasoning that supports 
Mr. Smith’s tactics. His policies lack foresight and are devoid of the kind of ethical 
responsibility his organization’s title implies. It is not acceptable to work for corporate 
responsibility by irresponsible means” (10/13/1987). 
 
Taken together, these types of statements called into the question the ethical nature of both the 
director of the ICCR and the organization itself.  
Discussion 
Shell’s responses to activists’ pressures for divestment from South Africa offer unique insight 
into how firms use other-focused OIM strategies to defend their legitimacy. Specifically, firms 
may intentionally or unintentionally delegitimize activists as a way to legitimize the firm. With 
regard to portraying activists’ logic as specious, Shell’s spokespersons aimed to present its 
decision to stay in South Africa as apart of the best solution for ending apartheid. Conversely, 
they presented arguments that divestment was a flawed solution as well as a strategy that was 
rejected by the stakeholders that it was meant to benefit. Spokespersons associated the firm with 
reputable Black leaders in South Africa; in essence, establishing its legitimacy via links to 
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favorable others (McDonnell, 2016; Mohammed et al., 1999). Yet, Shell went beyond 
acknowledging these favorable links to implying that any activist organization that did not 
adhere to the recommendations of pertinent stakeholder groups (e.g., Black leaders) should be 
considered illegitimate. Beyond using this rhetoric in letters to activist organizations, 
spokespersons used public forums (e.g., annual general meetings), the media, and letters and 
leaflets to consumers. The use of these outlets suggests that Shell desired to reduce external 
audiences’ support for large activist organizations leading the international boycott while 
simultaneously obtaining support for its decision to remain in South Africa. This is similar to 
how activists use defamatory rhetoric of firms to attract external support for their campaigns 
(Bartley & Child, 2014; Soule, 2009). 
  Spokespersons’ character attacks were intended for external audiences to question 
activists’ credibility and integrity. The repeated use of language such as “misleading,” 
“misrepresenting,” “false,” and “untrue” with regard to activists’ allegations suggests that 
external audiences could not rely on the evidence or rhetoric from activist organizations. 
Additionally, the use of language such as “terrorism” in regard to violence committed by small 
groups affiliated with the boycott served to raise questions about the of moral integrity of 
organizations leading the boycott. Although many social movements entail moderate and radical 
elements (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007), the radical elements of the boycott against Shell 
produced a negative, rather than a positive, flank effect (Haines, 2013). A positive flank effect 
entails radical activist organizations persuading a firm to work with moderate activist 
organizations in order to cease radical actions (e.g., destruction of property). Conversely, a 
negative flank effect entails radical actions having a detrimental impact on the legitimacy of 
moderate activist organizations, and by extension, the entire social movement. Rather than work 
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with moderate activist organizations like the AAM and ICCR, Shell’s spokespersons remained 
committed to staying in South Africa and used the violent actions of radical organizations to 
delegitimize the entire boycott. 
 Taken together, these rhetorical strategies of delegitimization offered Shell a way to 
deflect attention away from itself regarding its controversial investment in South Africa as 
spokespersons highlighted controversy related to international boycott. It is important to note 
that although the rhetorical strategies are presented distinctly, overlap between the two remains. 
For example, Shell’s rhetoric of activists as apartheid supporters not only challenges the logic of 
divestment, but it also represents a character attack. In general, the international community 
remained opposed to apartheid. World leaders, firms, and consumers deemed organizations that 
supported apartheid as lacking moral integrity (Klinghoffer, 1989). Thus, spokespersons 
language of activists’ being “in line” with apartheid supporters in South Africa represented an 
attack on activists’ integrity. 
 This study is not without its limitations. First, given that Shell’s corporate archives are 
closed to external researchers, a lack of internal documents reduces the opportunity to understand 
the full extent to which spokespersons used rhetorical strategies of delegitimization during the 
boycott. Second, given the historical nature of this study, it is difficult to capture the efficacy of 
these rhetorical strategies. Anecdotally, corporate executives at subsidiary locations and 
independent gas station owners used this rhetoric when questioned about the activist campaign. 
This evidence suggests that this rhetoric was accepted within the firm. Moreover, there is 
archival evidence that activists directly responded to spokespersons’ delegitimization, suggesting 
that the rhetoric was impactful enough to merit a response. Yet, questions remain regarding 
whether and how Shell’s delegitimization impacted external audiences such as consumers.  
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 Despite these limitations, this study makes several important contributions to the 
academic literature. This study represents the first examination of delegitimization as an other-
focused OIM strategy when firms confront social movement pressures. To date, research on how 
firms defend their legitimacy in response to activists has primarily emphasized self-focused 
strategies. I show that delegitimization represents a plausible strategy in firms’ “defensive 
repertoire” (McDonnell & King, 2013). This study also extends our understanding of firms’ use 
of social movement like strategies (e.g., Kraemer et al., 2013). Like activists, firms engage in 
grassroots lobbying (Walker, 2014) and protest controversial issues (McDonnell, 2016). In this 
study, I show that firms’ rhetorical strategies of delegitimization are similar to activists’ naming 
and shaming of firms (Bartley & Child, 2014). Whereas naming and shaming (i.e., defamation) 
is inherently intentional, delegitimization may be intentional or unintentional. Nevertheless, 
firms can ‘fight fire with fire’ when pressured by activists. Finally, this study of delegitimization 
adds to the typology of firms’ rhetorical strategies of legitimation (e.g., Suddaby & Greenwood, 
2005; Vaara, Tienari, & Laurila, 2006). 
Conclusion 
In this study, I examined how firms use rhetorical strategies of delegitimization when social 
movement activists pressure them. This study lays the foundation for future research on the role 
of delegitimization in firm—activist interactions. First, it is important to determine the interplay 
between self-focused and other-focused OIM strategies such as delegitimization. Questions 
remain as to when firms opt for one type of strategy versus another. Furthermore, how are 
strategies used in tandem and what effects do the interplay of strategies have on targets (e.g., 
activists) and other external audiences? Second, the extent to which firms use delegitimization 
remains in question. The insights from this study are generalizable to situations in which there 
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are multiple plausible solutions to social issue, such as sociopolitical conflict in a host country. 
Delegitimization may not be as salient in situations where firms are at fault (e.g., oil spill) and 
confront criticism from activists. These questions represent opportunities to continue theory 
development on the use of delegitimization, specifically, and firm—activist interactions in 
general.  
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Table 
Table 1: Categories of Rhetoric 
Second-Order 
Category First-Order Code Definition Example 
Activists' Logic 
as Specious 
Pro-Apartheid Support Claims that divestment would benefit White South African businessmen or apartheid supporters 
If Shell were to withdraw, two groups of people would be pleased, the activists 
outside South Africa, and the right wing Afrikaners inside (May 1986).  
Faulty Divestment 
Logic 
Claims that divestment did not result in major political 
changes by the South African government 
Several major companies have relinquished ownership of South African affiliates 
because of external pressure. These include General Motors, Barclays Bank and 
recently, Exxon who shed their small (200 employee) oil and chemical marketing 
company. But there has been no perceptible result in terms of change in South Africa 
Black Community 
Rejection 
Claims that Black leaders in South Africa were against 
divestment or wanted firms like Shell to remain in the 
country 
Polls and individual requests for help showed the black community opposed economic 
sanctions and wanted foreign companies to stay, Sir Peter said. He [Peter Holmes] told 
the meeting: "It is abundantly clear that those who have picked Shell for vilification 
and attack have picked the wrong target in the eyes of the black community" 
(05.12.1989) 
Inconsiderate of SA 
Majority 
Claims that divestment was detrimental to economic 
and social well-being of the majority of South Africans 
To provide jobs for its rapidly growing black population, and to deal with the huge 
socio-economic problems of the country, South Africa needs a growing economy. 
Disinvestment will certainly not help achieve this (May 1987). 
Character 
Attacks 
Terrorism Claims of activists' damage to Shell's property (e.g., petrol stations) 
A Shell petrol station at Wezep was destroyed by fire on May 12, 1986; twelve other 
Shell stations were vandalized. In pamphlets found near the burning petrol station it 
was stated that these damages were done because of [Shell's] involvement in South 
Africa (May 1986).  
Distortion of Facts Claims that activists' actions/claims were 'misguided', 'false', 'untrue', 'distorted' 
To give but one example which is particularly pernicious: the impression is being 
widely fostered that the South African police and military are dependent on Shell for 
their oil product supplies and that Shell is therefore responsible for their actions. This 
is untrue (09.23.1986). 	
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CHAPTER 3: SWEET AS SUGAR? THE ROLE OF CLOAKED CORPORATE 
RHETORIC IN IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT  
 
Abstract 
External audiences (e.g., social activists, the media) often pressure firms to change controversial 
corporate practices. Extant research emphasizes firms’ overt, or public, impression management 
strategies in response to these pressures. This study investigates firms’ covert, or secret, funding 
of front groups—organizations that claim to represent a civil society agenda, but primarily seek 
to defend corporate interests—in response to external audiences. Comparing the rhetoric of 
Coca-Cola and the Center for Consumer Freedom (CCF)—a front group that Coca-Cola covertly 
funded in response to anti-soda pressures between 2001 and 2005—offers insight into firms’ 
hidden agendas to delegitimize external audiences while striving to maintain a positive image in 
society. Specifically, while firms make public claims about their prosocial activities in response 
to audiences’ pressures, they may simultaneously fund front groups that aim to defame, or 
damage the reputation of, those same audiences. This study contributes to a more complete 
understanding of firms’ responses to external audiences by looking “behind the scenes” and 
emphasizing the role of cloaked corporate rhetoric in firms’ impression management. 
 
 
Keywords: Organizational impression management, rhetorical strategies, defamation 	
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Introduction 
“Now, remember the public face of Coca-Cola in particular is a very friendly, warm, 
open, public health loving, health, happiness, and love and family values. That’s their 
public face, and so you don’t want to be exposed behind the scenes of doing dirty tricks. 
So instead, you hire somebody else to do it.” – Dr. Marion Nestle (The Commonwealth 
Club, 2015) 
 
Over the past few decades, firms have confronted an increasing amount of pressure from external 
audiences (e.g., social activists, the media) to change controversial corporate practices (Briscoe 
& Gupta, 2016; Oliver, 1991). Firms typically respond to these pressures via impression 
management strategies—organizational attempts to “create, maintain, protect, or otherwise alter 
an image held by a target audience” (Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008: 1080). Many of 
firms’ impression management strategies are overt, or public, such as the sponsorship of social 
movement activism (McDonnell, 2016) or claims of a firm’s social and community activities 
(McDonnell & King, 2013). Yet, as the opening quote suggests, firms also engage in covert, or 
secret, impression management strategies. These strategies include the covert funding of front 
groups—organizations that claim to represent a civil society agenda, but primarily seek to defend 
corporate interests (Megalli & Friedman, 1991). Organizations such as ‘Get Government Off Our 
Back (GGOOB)’ and ‘Americans for Tax Reform’ have been exposed as front groups despite 
their appearance as civil society organizations (e.g., Apollonio & Bero, 2007). According to 
external sources, there were more than 100 active corporate front groups in the United States as 
of 2013 (Leitzinger, 2014; SourceWatch, 2013). Despite the prevalence of front groups in 
society, little is known about their role in firms’ impression management as front groups are not 
legally required to disclose information about specific corporate funders. Such an inquiry is 
important for a more complete understanding of firms’ impression management strategies, as 
called for by others (e.g., Bolino et al., 2008).  
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 This paper responds to this call by addressing the following research question: how do 
front groups defend firms targeted by external audiences? We maintain that front groups can 
serve to defame, or damage the reputation of, external audiences that pressure firms to change 
controversial corporate practices. Defamation is a rhetorical organizational impression 
management (OIM) strategy that entails creating a negative impression of others (Mohammed & 
Gardner, 2004). Goffman’s (1959) research on impression management offers insight into firms’ 
use of front groups to defame external audiences. In Goffman’s dramaturgical, or theater-based, 
conceptualization of impression management, performers often covertly seek the assistance of 
others (i.e., ‘teammates’) to manage impressions. Thus, in response to external audiences’ 
pressures, firms may simultaneously make public claims about their prosocial activities and 
covertly fund front groups that aim to defame those same audiences.  
 We examine this relationship by comparing the rhetoric of Coca-Cola and the Center for 
Consumer Freedom (CCF) and analyzing the media’s coverage of the CCF’s rhetoric between 
2001 and 2005. The CCF is a front group with the mission of “promoting personal responsibility 
and protecting consumer choices” (Center for Consumer Freedom, 2017). During the time period 
of study, Coca-Cola confronted anti-soda pressures given the increasing rates of obesity among 
adults and children in the United States. Coca-Cola responded publicly by making claims of its 
nutrition and fitness initiatives for the benefit of consumers. Yet, in 2004, a whistleblower leaked 
information confirming that Coca-Cola also covertly funded the CCF in response to these 
pressures (SourceWatch, 2004). After being questioned about this covert connection, a 
spokesperson for Coca-Cola acknowledged that the firm funded the CCF (Warner, 2005). 
A case study approach is appropriate to develop theory on the role of ‘cloaked’ corporate 
rhetoric in firms’ impression management because access to information linking specific firms to 
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specific front groups is rare (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). However, concrete evidence of 
Coca-Cola’s funding of the CCF during the time period of study and access to the CCF’s online 
archive allow for a unique opportunity to compare both organizations’ rhetoric. This comparison 
reveals Coca-Cola’s hidden agenda to delegitimize external audiences while striving to maintain 
a positive image in society. Overall, this study adds to our understanding of firms’ impression 
management strategies by looking “behind the scenes” and emphasizing the role of cloaked 
corporate rhetoric in firms’ impression management. Furthermore, this study contributes to the 
OIM literature by filling the dearth of research on “issues like defamation” (Bolino et al., 2008: 
1095).  
Conceptual Background 
Organizational impression management (OIM) is concerned with how organizations present 
themselves and others to target audiences (Bolino et al., 2008). When pressured by external 
audiences, firms often respond by presenting information about their accomplishments, social 
activities, and/or disassociation with a controversial practice (e.g., Elsbach, 1994; McDonnell & 
King, 2013). Conversely, firms protect or enhance their image by managing information about 
others (Cialdini, 1989). Although most OIM strategies are overt (Mohamed, Gardner, & Paolillo, 
1999), firms also engage in covert OIM strategies (McDonnell, 2016).  
 One covert OIM strategy is the funding of front groups. Although front groups appear to 
be civil society organizations, they are largely meant to serve the interests of anonymous 
corporate funders. Front groups have a long-standing history in the tobacco, beverage, food, and 
energy industries as a mechanism to respond to regulatory policies and activism (Megalli & 
Friedman, 1991; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Extant research on front groups emphasizes their 
characteristics, lobbying efforts, and efficacy in influencing public opinion. 
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First, front groups’ characteristics include names that indicate a general concern for 
public interest (Megalli & Friedman, 1991). Yet, front groups lack openness regarding their 
funding and objectives (Leitzinger, 2014), largely due to their legal exemptions in disclosing 
specific funders. Second, scholars have focused on the lobbying efforts of front groups 
(Apollonio & Bero, 2007; Walker, 2016). Some scholars label these lobbying efforts as 
‘astroturfing,’ or the creation of fake grassroots organizations to advance an agenda (Lyon & 
Maxwell, 2004; Walker, 2014). Third, several scholars have conducted experiments and have 
shown that front groups can influence public opinion on topics such as climate change (Cho, 
Martens, Kim, & Rodrigue, 2011) and legislation to control prescription prices under Medicare 
(Pfau, Haigh, Sims, & Wigley, 2007). Front groups are effective in that they undermine support 
for legislation and/or create uncertainty about the antecedents and consequences of social issues.  
This paper extends research on front groups by examining their rhetoric in defense of 
firms that are pressured by external audiences. Rhetoric, or communication used to persuade 
audiences (Green, 2004), is central to OIM research. When firms confront controversial 
situations, they strategically use rhetoric to maintain or restore legitimacy in the eyes of external 
audiences (Gao, Yu, & Cannella, 2016). For example, spokespersons in the cattle industry used 
acknowledgements and denials of wrongdoing following controversial events such as 
environmental protests (Elsbach, 1994). Other scholars have shown how firms use excuses or 
justifications following bad news and pressures from external audiences (e.g., Higgins & Synder, 
1989). We consider front groups’ rhetoric as a form of ‘cloaked’ corporate rhetoric given the 
anonymity of corporate funders. In order to understand how this ‘cloaked’ corporate rhetoric 
serves to defend firms, we turn to Goffman’s (1959) seminal work on individuals’ impression 
management. 
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A Dramaturgical Perspective on Impression Management 
In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), Erving Goffman adopted a 
dramaturgical, or theater-based, perspective on individuals’ impression management strategies 
within social interactions. He compared impression management to theater performances acted 
out in front of various audiences. Performers adjust the expressions they ‘give’ and ‘give off’ to 
convey an impression that they are who they claim to be. We draw upon two central themes in 
his work. First, performers typically do not act alone. Rather, they work in teams and cooperate 
to manage impressions. Often, there is one focal team member who is assisted by others. 
According to Goffman (1959: 80), “members of a team stage similar individual performances or 
stage dissimilar performances which fit together into a whole.” Thus, teammates’ performances 
may occur simultaneously. Depending on the situation, the cooperation between team members 
is kept secret from audiences so as to maintain positive impressions about one or more members 
of the team. Second, performers—and teams by extension—seek to minimize disruptions while 
managing impressions. Disruptions are instances when audiences accidentally or intentionally 
observe a performer act out of character. Disruptions can occur when a performer unknowingly 
makes a mistake (i.e., “gaffes”) or a “traitor” divulges secret information about the team to an 
audience (Goffman, 1959: 145, 209). Once a disruption occurs, audiences can determine whether 
performers are being genuine or simply putting on a front.  
Although Goffman’s conceptualization of impression management focuses on 
individuals, it is applicable to organizations (Gao et al., 2016). Like individuals, organizations 
seek to present themselves in a positive manner (Bolino et al., 2008). Organizations also assist 
one another to manage impressions, such as when multinational corporations hire public 
relations firms following a controversy (Daniels, 2011; Pagan, 1986). This teamwork helps the 
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focal organization defend its image. Given the relevance of Goffman’s work to organizations, it 
is appropriate to consider Goffman’s conceptualization of impression management in the study 
of front groups.  
We consider firms and front groups to be teammates that stage “dissimilar performances 
which fit together into a whole” (Goffman, 1959: 80).2 While firms can present themselves in a 
positive manner, front groups can defame the audiences that put pressure on firms. Defamation, 
or intent to damage the reputation of others, is a rhetorical OIM strategy that serves to defend a 
focal organization’s image (Cialdani, 1989; Mohammed et al., 1999). The ‘cloaked’ corporate 
rhetoric offered by front groups represents an extension of the firm’s true self but allows the firm 
to maintain a public front. We explore this relationship in the setting of Coca-Cola, Inc. 
confronting anti-soda pressures.  
Study Setting  
 
Between 1980 and 2000, the obesity rates among adults and children in the United States more 
than doubled from 15% to 31% and 5.5% to 14%, respectively (Ogden & Carroll, 2010a & b). 
Numerous organizations and researchers claimed that soda consumption contributed to the 
increase in obesity along with its harmful consequences such as Type 2 diabetes (e.g., Jacobson, 
1998; Ludwig, Peter & Gortmaker, 2001). Several researchers recommended that national and 
local “public health strategies to prevent obesity and Type 2 diabetes should focus on reducing 
sugar-sweetened beverage consumption” (Schulze et al., 2004: 934). These types of 
recommendations influenced state-level legislation designed to reduce soda consumption. In 
2003, California became the first state in the US to ban the sale of soft drinks in public 
elementary and middle schools as a way to reduce obesity among children. Other states such as 
Texas, Arkansas, and New Jersey eventually followed California’s initiative. In addition to soda 																																																								
2 Emphasis added. 
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bans, external audiences (e.g., activists, legislators, lawyers, the media) called for taxes on soda 
as a way to discourage consumers from drinking this beverage given its sugar content.   
 Coca-Cola, Inc. confronted significant pressure to reduce the amount of sugar in its 
drinks and stop marketing soda to youths (Leith, 2003). Pressure from nongovernmental 
organizations, the media, and school administrators, along with proposed soda bans and taxes 
across the US, compelled former Coca-Cola CEO John Alm to call the obesity issue “a war 
that’s been declared on our company” (Leith, 2003: 19). In addition to Coca-Cola’s public 
response to these external pressures, Coca-Cola covertly funded the Center for Consumer 
Freedom (CCF).3		
The CCF initially began in 1996 with covert funding from Philip Morris to defend the 
restaurant and hospitality industries from anti-smoking and anti-drinking activism and 
legislation.4 Although the founder of the CCF, Richard Berman, admits that the CCF is 
supported by various industries, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not require the CCF to 
disclose its funders. This exemption has largely allowed firms to fund the CCF anonymously. In 
2004, however, a whistleblower sent documents regarding the CCF’s funders to the Center for 
Media and Democracy, a watchdog organization based in Washington DC. These documents 
provided evidence that Coca-Cola contributed $200,000 to the CCF in 2001—one of the largest 
contributions the CCF received that year.5 When questioned about this financial connection, a 
spokesperson for Coca-Cola acknowledged the connection and called the CCF “another voice in 
the debate [on obesity]” (Warner, 2005).  
																																																								
3 Although Pepsico, Inc. also confronted anti-soda pressures, we do not include an analysis of PepsiCo’s responses 
to such pressure as several sources confirm that the firm never funded the CCF (e.g., Nestle, 2015).	
4 Letter from Barbara Trach, Senior Program Manager of Public Affairs, at Philip Morris to Richard Berman 
(12.21.1995). Document #207395963 of United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.  
5 The list of corporate funders can be found at the following link: 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/CCF_funding 
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The action of a whistleblower in this setting provides a unique opportunity to compare 
the rhetoric of firms and front groups and extend theory on firms’ impression management 
strategies in response to external audiences. Although firms also use industry and trade 
associations to manage impressions (Elsbach, 1994), the CCF is different. According to food 
industry officials, the CCF “can be more vociferous, provocative and irreverent in its criticisms 
than a trade association” (Mayer & Joyce, 2005). Examination of this type of rhetoric is rare 
given the anonymity of corporate ties to front groups. Yet, concrete evidence of a financial 
connection between Coca-Cola and the CCF from at least 2001 to 2005 (the time period of 
study) offers insight into the role of cloaked corporate rhetoric in impression management.  
Method 
Case study methodology is appropriate for the examination of phenomena under rare 
circumstances (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Furthermore, examining organizational rhetoric is 
appropriate for understanding impression management (e.g., Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). Thus, we 
primarily focus on publicly available documents from Coca-Cola and the CCF. In total, there 
were 195 public documents between the two organizations during the time period of study. 
Additionally, videos of the CCF’s organizational objectives and an interview with a legislator 
targeted by the CCF serve to build stronger assertions about interpretations of the findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Data Sources 
 Coca-Cola’s Documents. Between 2001 and 2005, Coca-Cola issued press releases 
detailing its social and community initiatives (see Table 2). We obtained 83 relevant corporate 
press releases from PR Newswire Business Wire in LexisNexis using search terms such as 
“soda,” “obesity,” “well-being,” “health,” “community,” and “consumer choice.” 
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Center for Consumer Freedom’s Documents, Images, & Videos. The CCF maintains a 
comprehensive archive of documents it has produced since 2000. We gathered all soda- and pop-
related daily news articles, press releases, opinion editorials, and images from 2001 to 2005 from 
its website. There were a total of 112 soda- and pop-related documents and images. Additionally, 
the CCF provides links to 3 videos that feature Richard Berman discussing the objectives of his 
organization. The total length of these videos is approximately 20 minutes.   
Interview with  Legislator. We conducted an hour-long interview with a legislator targeted 
by the CCF given proposed bans on soda sales in schools. The phone interview included 
questions regarding the CCF’s rhetoric toward the legislator, differences between Coca-Cola’s 
and the CCF’s rhetoric, and firms’ use of front groups in general. 
Media Coverage. We searched newspapers via LexisNexis and Proquest using the 
keywords “Center for Consumer Freedom,” AND “soda,” “beverage,” “pop,” or “Coca-Cola” 
between 2001 and 2005. This search yielded 35 articles across local and national newspapers in 
the US that referenced the CCF’s rhetoric.  
Data Analysis 
Rhetorical Strategies. Data analysis entailed an iterative process of qualitatively 
analyzing the data and comparing the findings to extant literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
analysis began with an initial reading of the CCF’s documents and identification of the 
organization’s opponents. They include activists, scientists, legislators, lawyers, and news 
columnists who critiqued beverage firms and/or linked soda consumption to increasing obesity 
rates in the United States. Then, we open-coded the documents for rhetorical strategies used 
against these opponents (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This coding suggested that the CCF primarily 
aimed to trivialize the work (e.g., research, policies) of its opponents, promote research 
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concluding that there is no causal link between soda consumption and obesity, and emphasize the 
role of exercise in reducing obesity. It was during this phase that we observed the CCF’s explicit 
defense of Coca-Cola. We also open-coded Coca-Cola’s press releases to understand its 
responses. Both Coca-Cola and the CCF attempted to defend the firm as well as the beverage 
industry from anti-soda pressures, which led us to the organizational impression management 
(OIM) literature.   
Following established norms for case studies (e.g., Elsbach & Sutton, 1992), we engaged 
in a second round of coding for established and new OIM strategies. The reliability of the codes 
was tested on a random sample of 20 documents (approximately 10% of the total). An 
independent coder and the first author established an intercoder reliability of 0.83. Coding 
differences were resolved by discussion and mutual agreement. This phase of coding produced 
six categories of rhetoric. Next, axial coding, or the process of comparing categories with one 
another and defining their properties (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), reduced the number of categories 
to five (see Table 3).  
Media Coverage of the CCF’s Rhetoric. We also analyzed the media’s coverage of the 
CCF’s responses to anti-soda pressures to better understand which rhetorical strategies attracted 
the most attention. Following established norms for media coverage of organizational rhetoric 
(e.g., Huang, 2006), first we mapped (a) quotes by organizational spokespersons and (b) media 
references to what the CCF said onto specific categories of rhetoric. Second, we determined 
which categories of rhetoric where mentioned by different types of newspapers (national vs. 
local). Third, we categorized the news articles as positive, neutral, or negative towards the CCF.  
Findings 
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Overall, Coca-Cola implemented two salient rhetorical strategies—claims of self-regulation and 
prosocial claims—and the CCF implemented three salient rhetorical strategies—claims of 
professional incompetence, claims of imposition, and character attacks. These rhetorical 
strategies served as a defense of Coca-Cola and the beverage industry, by extension. We present 
these findings in detail below. 
An Analysis of Coca-Cola’s Rhetoric 
Claims of Self-Regulation. First, Coca-Cola made claims of self-regulation, or public 
claims that a firm voluntarily changes its practices for the benefit of others. Following the 
publication of research claiming a positive relationship between children’s body mass index 
(BMI) and soda consumption (Ludwig et al., 2001), Coca-Cola announced new practices for the 
firm’s operations in schools. Coca-Cola called on its bottlers to offer healthier products (e.g., 
waters, juices) to students. Coca-Cola also removed its advertisements from vending machines 
and replaced them with non-commercial graphics to reduce its marketing to students. 
Subsequently, following California’s ban of soda sales in elementary and middle schools in 
2003, Coca-Coca immediately announced the Model Guidelines for School Beverage 
Partnerships. These improved guidelines included a refusal to sell soda to elementary school 
students during the school day and “respect [for] the right of parents, teachers and school 
officials to choose the beverages that will be available to their students.”6 These guidelines were 
supported by the entire U.S. Coca-Cola bottling system as well as some educators, who served as 
advisors on the guidelines.  
Prosocial Claims. Second, Coca-Cola made prosocial claims, or public claims of 
corporate social actions (McDonnell & King, 2013), in response to audiences’ pressures. 																																																								
6 Coca-Cola issues model guidelines for school beverage partnerships; new approach to help U.S. Schools raise 
critical resources while addressing childhood health and nutrition concerns and promoting balance through more 
beverage choices (11.17.2003) 
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Prosocial claims were apparent in nearly 90% of Coca-Cola’s press releases, yet nutrition- and 
fitness-specific claims occurred in approximately 10% of the press releases. In particular, Coca-
Cola announced new partnerships with non-profit organizations to create national fitness 
initiatives, such as “Step With It!”—a challenge for children to take a minimum of 10,000 steps 
per day to promote healthy lifestyles. Similarly, Coca-Cola created an educational campaign 
called “Your Power to Choose…Fitness Health Fun” to teach students about making wise health 
choices. Although Coca-Cola only made two explicit references to obesity in the non-financial 
component of its press releases, the firm maintained a health-conscious image. Beyond its focus 
on nutrition and fitness, Coca-Cola generally portrayed itself as a member of local communities 
across the US.  
An Analysis of the Center for Consumer Freedom’s Rhetoric 
In a 60 Minutes media interview, Richard Berman exclaimed that one of the central goals of the 
CCF is to “shoot the messenger,” or get “people to understand this messenger is not as credible 
as their name would suggest” (CBS News, 2007). These ‘messengers’ included activists, 
researchers, legislators, news columnists, and lawyers. The CCF intended to defame, or damage 
the reputation of, members of these groups given their pressures against Coca-Cola (see Table 4).  
Claims of Professional Incompetence. The CCF’s first rhetorical strategy entailed claims 
of professional incompetence—claims that the audiences pressuring firms engaged in or cited 
“poor science” linking soda consumption to obesity. Claims of professional incompetence 
accounted for approximately one-third of the codes in the data analysis. These claims included 
critiques of researchers’ statistical errors, overlooked findings, methodological rigor, and biases 
in seeking predetermined research outcomes. For example, the CCF often critiqued the accuracy 
of the Center for Science in the Public Interest’s (CSPI’s) “Liquid Candy” report (Jacobson, 
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1998), which initially stated that 13 to 18 year-old boys consumed an average of 3.5 cans of soda 
per day. This statement was made in error, as the actual average consumption among this group 
was 1.67 cans per day. Although the CSPI retracted this statement, the CCF used this error to 
cast doubts about the CSPI’s credibility. In reference to the CSPI’s anti-soda campaign, the CCF 
notes, 
In today’s Washington Post, CSPI’s “Liquid Candy” anti-soda report is cited as “proof” 
of the damage sugar in soda can do to children’s health. Though it is debatable exactly 
how much “proof” can be obtained from a report that had to be retracted and recast days 
after its release due to poor science. – (“Anti-Pop Crusade Loses its Fizz,” The Cincinnati 
Enquirer, 11/13/1998).7 
 
The CCF claimed that organizations such as the CSPI offered unreliable information given the 
“poor science” they engaged in. Additionally, the CCF focused on underemphasized research 
findings and study limitations to suggest that the science positively linking soda and obesity was 
incorrect and that the espoused negative health consequences of soda were non-existent or 
limited.  
The CCF also claimed that researchers’ studies that linked soda consumption and obesity 
were not methodologically rigorous due to small sample sizes. For example, the CCF criticized a 
study by Roland Griffiths, who found that caffeinated soft drinks were addictive based on a 
sample of 25 taste testers (Griffiths & Vernotica, 2000). The CCF called Griffiths’ findings 
“baseless” and bolstered its arguments against the study with the following remarks:  
Alan Leshner, director of the National Institute of Drug Abuse (which funded Griffiths’ 
research) argues this [finding], noting that Griffiths study included only 25 subjects, too 
few to allow real scientific conclusions. 
 
Beyond the CCF’s own critique of researchers’ methods, the CCF made references to credible 
research organizations such as the National Institute of Drug Abuse and Center for Disease 
																																																								
7 Soda and Gomorrah (01.03.2001) 
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Control and Prevention (CDC) in an attempt to delegitimize researchers. External critiques of 
researchers’ studies supported the CCF’s argument that researchers’ studies were inconclusive.  
The CCF contended that researchers’ studies were biased towards conclusions positively 
linking soda consumption and obesity. CCF spokespersons accused researchers of altering 
statistics in order to push forward biased agendas. In reference to a study linking soda 
consumption with diabetes (Schultze et al., 2004), Richard Berman stated,  
“The statistical contortions that these authors went through to demonize soda would make 
our own gold medal gymnasts proud. It’s not surprising given their [the authors’] history 
of biased anti-soda activism and their ties to CSPI.”8 
 
The CCF used language such as “statistical hocus pocus,” “statistical contortions,” and 
“statistical malpractice” to describe research studies done by its opponents. This language 
suggested that the outcomes of researchers’ studies were predetermined. Deviations from 
predetermined links between soda and obesity were overlooked, or simply altered, to fit the 
agendas of researchers. According to the CCF, this bias along with statistical errors, overlooked 
findings, and lack of methodological rigor contributed to the “poor science” in the soda 
consumption and obesity debate. 
 Beyond its critiques of researchers’ and activists’ studies, the CCF took issue with others 
who cited these studies. For example, George Washington University professor John Banzhaf 
threatened to sue the Seattle School Board for renewing soft-drink vending contracts. His threat 
of a lawsuit was largely based on Ludwig et al.’s (2001) findings. In response, the CCF stated 
As it happens, the kind of evidence that Banzhaf and his lawsuit-happy brethren use to 
demonize fizzy drinks wouldn’t pass muster in a high-school science class.9  
 
																																																								
8 Soda Study is the Latest Fizzy Science from Food Police 
9 Anti-Soda Bandwagon Fueled by Junk Science (07-24-2003) 
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This quote is representative of numerous critiques of individuals who based their arguments on 
“poor science.” According to the CCF, the trial lawyers, news columnists, and legislators citing 
this evidence were not credible individuals that consumers should listen to.  
  Claims of Imposition. The CCF’s second rhetorical strategy entailed claims of 
imposition, or claims that its opponents imposed unwarranted restrictions on consumers’ 
beverage choices. Claims of impositions represented the CCF’s most common rhetorical strategy 
(evident in nearly 50% of the codes in the data analysis). In particular, the CCF referred to many 
of its opponents as “nannies”—individuals, groups, and organizations that sought to control soda 
consumption by enacting soda taxes and banning sales of soda in schools. California senator 
Deborah Ortiz was often a target of the CCF for her attempts to pass legislation that reduced 
soda consumption. During debates on the ban of soda sales in schools in California in 2003, the 
CCF noted,  
The California legislature’s top lifestyle nanny has finally scored a win. Deborah Ortiz’s 
bill to phase out soft drinks in schools passed the state Senate last week and was sent to 
the state Assembly.10  
 
The CCF viewed all legislative attempts at reducing soda consumption across the US as part of 
an undesired ‘Nanny Culture.’ Coupled with language about “nannies,” the CCF often used 
language such as governmental “intrusion” and “intervention” to depict proposed soda bans and 
taxes. Taken together, this language suggested that consumers had a personal responsibility for 
their beverage choices. These choices should not be left up to activists, legislators, and others 
who believed that regulation was the best way for consumers to change their soda consumption 
habits.  
Similarly, educating children about soda consumption was the responsibility of parents, 
not legislators. The CCF remarked that simply removing soda from schools was not beneficial in 																																																								
10 SPECIAL REPORT: Soda Ban Lacks Scientific Fizz (06.05.2003) 
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teaching children to make good choices. Parents could teach their children that soda consumption 
in moderation was acceptable. Yet, the removal of soda from schools deemed legislators as better 
equipped than parents to teach children. In 2002, California senator Maria Escutia sponsored a 
bill that limited the sale of carbonated beverages at middle schools. This bill eventually became a 
law. The CCF responded, 
The law is just the latest statue to confuse the roles of government and family. A mother 
herself, Escutia of all people should know that choices about children’s diets are best 
made by parents. Would Escutia want the state to suggest that she was not capable of 
selecting a healthy diet for her own children—or herself?11  
 
The CCF took issue with blurring the lines between governmental and parental responsibilities. 
CCF spokespersons claimed that parents were more than capable of monitoring the diets of their 
children and imposition by legislators was unwarranted. 
Rather than imposing unwarranted regulations on soda, the CCF argued that its 
opponents should have spent more political energy “to address the real cause of childhood 
obesity: physical inactivity.”12 The CCF cited several academic studies that concluded that 
children did not engage in much physical activity at home or at school (e.g., Gordon-Larsen, 
McMurray, & Popkin, 2000). These studies attributed the increase in obesity to a lack of 
exercise. Additionally, the CCF used visual rhetoric to depict opponents’ lack of focus on 
physical education to address obesity. In one image, two obese students walk down an empty 
hallway and notice that two vending machines are missing (see Figure 1). One student exclaims 
that taking away soda machines does not matter, so long as “they [legislators in California] don’t 
pass a law making gym class mandatory we won’t be getting thirsty anyway.”13 This image 
																																																								
11 Soda and Snack Foods in Schools (01.29.2002) 
12 Soft Drinks in Schools Aren’t to Blame for Obese Children (09.18.2005) 
13 No More School Pop Machines (09.28.2005) 
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suggests that rather than blaming beverage firms for obesity, legislators should have prioritized 
anti-obesity initiatives in schools to encourage children to exercise.  
Character Attacks. The CCF’s third rhetorical strategy entailed character attacks—claims 
that opponents were illegitimate, hypocritical, and/or out of touch with the wants and needs of 
others (e.g., consumers, schools). Character attacks were apparent in nearly 20% of codes in the 
data analysis. According to the CCF, some organizations that put pressure on beverage firms like 
Coca-Cola lacked the credentials to be taken seriously. In particular, the American Medical 
Student Association (AMSA) declared a “National No Soda Day” on November 18, 2004. The 
CCF responded by highlighting that the student organization had no official ties to the American 
Medical Association, one of the most reputable organizations in the medical field. The CCF also 
attacked AMSA’s organizational legitimacy by noting,  
Some final causes taken on by AMSA’s oh-so-serious members, who resemble a 
fraternity more than a medical group: “Med students love to party, bike for democracy, 
and meet up with other young folks organizing for change!”14 
 
The CCF deemed organizations like AMSA as illegitimate because members did not have the 
formal credentials (e.g., educational degrees, status) to support their claims. Thus, the CCF 
argued, consumers should not have taken these organizations’ soda claims seriously.   
The CCF also considered many of its opponents to be out of touch with the desires of 
consumers and needs of schools. Most consumers, according to the CCF, simply wanted to enjoy 
their beverages without being told how much to drink. Regulation, in essence, was anti-
consumer. Rhetorical claims of opponents being out of touch were especially notable in 
reference to legislation to remove soda from schools. Regarding California Governor Gray Davis 
and Senator Martha Escutia’s anti-soda legislation, the CCF remarked 
																																																								
14 ‘Dense’ Soda Jerks Push Misleading Pop Boycott (11.19.2004)	
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Yet Davis and Escutia feel comfortable forcing families and students to accept a Brave 
New California where classmates bring in boxes of rice cakes to share on their birthdays, 
douse the coach with a jug of soymilk after winning the homecoming game, and celebrate 
the end of exams with a big tofu party.15 
 
The CCF coupled these rhetorical claims with images and symbols to suggest that legislators 
were severely out of touch with consumers. In one image, two students walk down a school 
hallway and observe vending machines with the brands ‘Carrot-Cola,’ ‘Veggie Dew,’ and ‘Dr. 
Green Pepper’ (see Figure 2). An upset student exclaims, “The nutritionists have, like, gone too 
far.”16 This image suggests that legislators do not understand the desires of students, who prefer 
traditional drinks like Coca-Cola.  
 According to the CCF, anti-soda policies led to negative consequences for schools that 
depended on contracts with beverage firms. Schools often used this funding to maintain athletic 
programs, subsidize students’ field trips, and purchase academic equipment such as computers. 
In response to proposed legislation in Virginia, the CCF reported 
Cloaking anti-soda rhetoric in the protective mantle of “childhood obesity” ignores a 
crucial reality: Soda bans don’t slim down our kids. As the case of Virginia shows, they 
just slim down schools’ budgets.17 
 
The CCF specified the amount of money schools would lose, such as school districts in Virginia 
losing up to $900,000 per year due to soda bans. It also considered these bans to be ineffective, 
as students would still drink sodas at home or elsewhere. Soda bans, according to the CCF, 
would just cost schools much needed income for students’ academic and social development. 
Coca-Cola and the CCF’s “Dissimilar Performances” 
																																																								
15 Soda and Snack Foods in Schools (01.29.2002) 
16 The Nutritionists Have Gone Too Far (01.16.2004)	
17 Spare the Soda, Spoil the School (04.13.2004) 
 
 
	 46 
Coca-Cola and the CCF enacted dissimilar performances, particularly when comparing the 
content and tone of their rhetoric as well as the audiences that they attempted to convince (see 
Table 5). The CCF’s defamatory rhetoric stood in stark contrast to Coca-Cola’s rhetoric, which 
entailed arguments that the firm was a positive force for social change on the obesity issue. 
Coca-Cola typically did not respond directly to the criticism it confronted, but rather maintained 
a stance that it was a socially responsible firm. For example, during the 2003 legislative debates 
in California regarding soda bans in elementary and middle schools, Coca-Cola continued its 
promotion of physical activity for students across the nation (Leith, 2003). At the same time, the 
CCF criticized legislators for imposing regulations and being out of touch with consumers. 
Specifically, the CCF noted, 
Does the government really want students leaving school grounds en masse to buy their 
favorite beverages? [Deborah] Ortiz obviously doesn’t seem to know any teenagers—
they’re not likely to stop drink cola or root beer just because she tells them to.  
 
This example is representative of the CCF’s responses to the external pressures Coca-Cola 
confronted. The CCF was direct in its intent to defame the individuals putting pressures on Coca-
Cola—to the point of mentioning individuals by name and attacking their credibility.  
 It is important to note that although there are stark differences between the content of 
Coca-Cola’s and the CCF’s rhetoric, there was one instance when a Coca-Cola spokesperson 
offered defamatory rhetoric against an activist organization. As Table 4 shows, Susan McCombs 
considered the CSPI’s Save Harry Campaign to be a form of “sensationalism,” as Coca-Cola 
sought to promote reading among youths who watched the Harry Potter film. The tone of this 
rhetoric, however, is mild in comparison to the CCF’s rhetoric regarding the CSPI’s campaign. 
Language such as “[the] CSPI is the first to whine” about firms’ marketing to youths suggests a 
tone of disdain for the CSPI’s actions. Whereas the tone of Coca-Cola’s rhetoric was generally 
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positive, or slightly negative in this instance, the CCF maintained slightly and extremely 
negative rhetoric about various individuals and organizations.  
 The content and tone of both organizations’ rhetoric were meant to influence people’s 
perceptions of Coca-Cola and the external audiences that put pressure on the firm. Coca-Cola 
primarily sought to convince legislators, social activists, school administrators, and consumers 
that healthier drink options as well as soda consumption in moderation were beneficial to adults 
and children (Leith, 2003). Coca-Cola’s spokespersons were often present at debates within 
school districts or conferences pertaining to the obesity issue. Spokespersons desired for external 
audiences (some of whom critiqued the firm) to have a positive impression of the firm as an 
organization that was playing a large role in reducing obesity among adults and children. The 
CCF, however, primarily sought to convince consumers that some of those same audiences were 
wrong in their criticisms and pressures against Coca-Cola. In many of its documents, the CCF 
asked rhetorical questions, including whether individuals should lose their freedom of beverage 
choices. Rhetorical questions were meant to engage consumers and have them question the logic 
of the external audiences putting pressure on Coca-Cola. In addition to placing advertisements 
about obesity in national and local newspapers, the CCF encouraged consumers to visit its 
website and/or subscribe to its press releases and daily news headlines. These documents often 
included links to research studies or media reports that validated its arguments. Thus, while 
Coca-Cola was broad in its attempts to maintain a positive impression, the CCF narrowed its 
focus on consumers in order to convince them that critics of Coca-Cola were illegitimate.   
Media Coverage of the CCF’s Rhetoric: The Other Side of the Story 
National (e.g., The New York Times) and local (e.g., The Denver Post) media coverage of the 
CCF’s rhetoric offers insight into which strategies attracted the most attention. As shown in 
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Table 6, claims of imposition attracted the most attention in both local and national media outlets 
(nearly 50% of all media references to the CCF’s rhetoric). Character attacks and claims of 
professional incompetence were also salient in local newspapers, but rarely found in national 
newspapers. This suggests that local newspapers were more willing to give attention to the 
CCF’s extremely negative rhetoric about critics of Coca-Cola. One local newspaper in particular, 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, provided an outlet for the CCF’s spokespersons on several 
occasions. The choice of this particular outlet for the CCF’s rhetoric may correspond to the fact 
that Atlanta is a major metropolitan area and the location of Coca-Cola’s headquarters. 
 The majority of articles (approximately 77%) across national and local newspapers were 
neutral in their tone towards the CCF. These articles simply referred to the CCF’s rhetoric, but 
the news columnists did not offer an opinion on the CCF. Among the remaining articles, 
however, local newspapers were more positive towards the CCF and its defamatory rhetoric. For 
example, one news columnist adopted the CCF’s language, called the CSPI “the grand nanny,” 
and advocated that “we [consumers] embrace the brave goal of CCF” (Williamson, 2002). 
Conversely, columnists at national newspapers were more critical of the CCF and believed that 
the organization acted as an impediment to obesity reduction across the nation (e.g., Krugman, 
2005). This dichotomy in tone towards the CCF suggests that local newspapers were more likely 
to serve as an indirect mechanism for the CCF to influence consumers. Local newspapers not 
only allowed CCF spokespersons to submit editorials, but these outlets were also more likely to 
suggest that the CCF was correct in its stance on the obesity issue.  
Discussion 
Exposure of Coca-Cola’s funding of the CCF between 2001 and 2005 offers unique insight into 
the role that front groups have in firms’ impression management responses to external audiences. 
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Coca-Cola’s public rhetoric entailed the portrayal of the firm as a positive contributor to the 
reduction of obesity in the United States. Yet, the exposure of Coca-Cola’s covert financial 
connection to the CCF shows the firm’s hidden agenda to delegitimize individuals and 
organizations associated with the anti-soda movement. The CCF’s defamatory rhetoric was in 
stark contrast to Coca-Cola’s positive, prosocial rhetoric. The CCF defended Coca-Cola and 
beverage firms, more generally, in hopes that consumers would dismiss external criticisms of 
Coca-Cola and continue drinking soda.  
This study also offers insight into the limits, or boundaries, of a firm’s rhetoric when 
targeted by external audiences. Coca-Cola’s attempts to portray itself in a positive, socially 
responsible manner remained within expected boundaries, as other scholars conclude that firms 
make prosocial claims in response to external audiences (McDonnell & King, 2013). Yet, claims 
of professional incompetence, claims of imposition, and character attacks are rhetorical OIM 
strategies that typically fall outside of these expected boundaries. This study shows that firms 
like Coca-Cola are willing to outsource more aggressive and negative rhetoric as a way to defend 
the firm. This relationship aligns with Goffman’s (1959) notion that teammates can engage in 
dissimilar performances. Front groups convey the rhetoric that firms desire to convey, but cannot 
convey as they do not want to be perceived as deviating from social norms.  
 This study is not without limitations. First, it only includes the perspective of one 
individual targeted by the CCF during the time period of study. The perspectives of other 
legislators, news columnists, or organizations, such as the CSPI, would allow for a more in-depth 
analysis of the differences between Coca-Cola’s and the CCF’s rhetoric. Second, the time period 
of this study does not allow for an understanding of whether the CCF’s rhetoric influenced 
consumers to increase their support for Coca-Cola. Although several of the CCF’s documents 
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mention the support it received from various media outlets, information about consumers’ 
responses is lacking. We compensate for this lack of information by tracking the media coverage 
of the CCF’s rhetoric, which allows for some insight into how external audiences perceived the 
CCF.  
 Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the academic literature in the following 
ways. First, this study moves the literature beyond a focus on firms’ overt impression 
management strategies in response to external audiences (e.g., McDonnell, 2016) to a focus on 
firms’ covert responses via front groups. Extant research on front groups primarily emphasizes 
their lobbying efforts (e.g., Apollonio & Bero, 2007; Walker, 2016). Yet, front groups are more 
than lobbying mechanisms and can serve to defame the external audiences that put pressure on 
firms. Second, this study adds to our understanding of defamation. Although there is recognition 
that defamation is a salient organizational impression management strategy (Bolino et al., 2008), 
there is only one empirical study on defamation and it is in the context of firm-to-firm interaction 
(Mohammed & Gardner, 2004). This study emphasizes the indirect means by which firms 
defame external audiences (e.g., social activists), thereby extending the relevance of defamation 
to new contexts. Third, this study extends Goffman’s (1959) conceptualization of teammates’ 
dissimilar performances to an organizational context. Firms and front groups represent 
teammates that enact different rhetorical strategies to legitimize the focal firm.  
This study lays the foundation for future research on the role of front groups in firms’ 
impression management. First, there is room for more research on the rhetorical strategies of 
front groups. Given the prevalence of front groups in society (e.g., Leitzinger, 2014), access to 
organizational archives may represent an opportunity to compare rhetoric across several front 
groups to uncover new impression management strategies. Second, this study focused on a well-
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known front group in the US. There are front groups in Canada, Europe, and Australia 
(SourceWatch, 2013). Future research can explore the global scope of front groups and compare 
the rhetorical strategies of these organizations across countries. Third, how front groups’ 
defamatory rhetoric influences consumers remains an open question. Are consumers more likely 
to support firms after receiving front groups’ rhetoric? Following others (e.g., Cho et al., 2011), 
future experimental research can help address this question. These future directions represent 
opportunities to continue theory development on the role of cloaked corporate rhetoric in 
impression management. 
Beyond theory development, this study raises a broader public policy question. How can 
the influence of front groups be mitigated? The designation of front groups as tax-exempt, non-
profit organizations under the Internal Revenue Service code 501(c)(3) will remain a challenge 
for legislators and activists who seek to expose anonymous corporate funders of front groups. 
Thus, we recommend that legislators collaborate with activist organizations, such as the Center 
for Media and Democracy, to create educational campaigns for consumers. To begin, it is 
important for consumers to understand that front groups exist in society. This knowledge should 
be coupled with advice for consumers to question the sources of the information they receive, 
particularly with regard to debatable social issues such as the health effects of soda consumption. 
Beyond simply understanding the mission and objectives of non-profit organizations, consumers 
should know the sources of funding for those organizations. This knowledge will help consumers 
make better decisions regarding the information disseminated from these organizations. 
Additionally, when a firm is exposed as funding a front group, legislators and activists should 
generate media attention regarding these covert ties. The media exposure (and potential societal 
backlash) may discourage other firms from funding front groups. Overall, educational campaigns 
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can help mitigate the influence of front groups given that their legal ability to obtain funds from 
firms covertly will likely remain the same in the foreseeable future.  
Conclusion 
In this study, we examined how firms use front groups in response to external audiences’ 
pressures to change controversial corporate practices. Front groups’ ‘cloaked’ corporate rhetoric 
serves to present the focal firm in a positive manner by defaming the same audiences that put 
pressures on firms. The study of front groups represents an important research direction so as to 
better understand how firms respond to external audiences. Beyond overt OIM strategies, 
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Tables 	
    Table 2: Data Sources 
Data Source Count 
Coca-Cola Press Releases 83 
CCF Daily News Articles & Press 
Releases 106 
CCF Images 6 
Video References to CCF 3 
Media Mentions of CCF's Response  35 		
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    Table 3: Rhetorical Strategies 
1st Order Code 2
nd Order 
Category Definition Example 
Restrict Marketing  
Claims of Self-
regulation* 
Claims that a firm voluntarily changes 
its practices for the benefit of others 
The Company will adhere to the following 
practices…Vending machine graphics should show a 
wide variety of beverage options. As new equipment is 
placed in schools, signage on vending machines will 
feature graphics that promote educational activities, 
physical fitness and non-carbonated beverage choices. 
(11.17.2003) 
End Exclusive Contracts 
Offer Healthier Products 
Health-oriented Social 
Initiatives 
Prosocial Claims Claims of a firm's social and community initiatives 
The Coca-Cola Company and its major bottlers today 
announced Live It!(TM), a new health and fitness 
initiative designed to help students build healthy 
lifestyles by encouraging physical activity as part of their 
daily lives and providing nutrition information in schools. 
(05.26.2005) 
Non-health-oriented Social 
Initiatives 
Questionable Research 
Claims of 
Professional 
Incompetence* 
Claims that the audiences pressuring 
firms engaged in or cited "poor 
science" linking soda consumption to 
obesity 
So statistical significance is important when it comes to 
an incidental result like water consumption, but it is 
overlooked if their pre-determined soda-obesity link is 
threatened. (04.23.2004) 
Citing Questionable 
Research 
Third-party Critique 
Questionable Motives 
Nanny State 
Claims of 
Imposition* 
Claims that audiences imposed 
unwarranted restrictions on consumers' 
beverage choices 
Obesity-warriors like Ortiz--the same legislator who 
wants food menus with endless nutrition warnings (e.g., 
"ice cream contains fat and sugar")--believe they have a 
mandate to teach us all the basics about health and 
nutrition. Parents, under the wishful impression that 
keeping their kids physically fit is their job (not the 
government's), stand corrected. (06.12.2003) 
Teaching Children 
Diverting 
Belittling  
Character Attacks 
Claims that audiences were 
illegitimate, hypocritical, and/or out of 
touch with the needs and wants of 
others (e.g., consumers, schools) 
In August 2003, he [news columnist Derrick Z. Jackson] 
flew over the cuckoo's nest when he claimed: "The death 
toll from soda, chips, candy burger bombs would be 
considered a war crime if committed by Saddam 
Hussein." That's a pretty outrageous statement, even for a 
soda jerk. (12.08.2004) 
Hypocrisy 
Out of Touch  
Vilification 
       * indicates a new rhetorical strategy for the literature  	
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   Table 4: CCF Targets 
Rhetorical Strategy Activist 
Organizations 
Scientific 
Researchers 
Legislators Lawyers Media Total 
Claims of Professional 
Incompetence 25 47 39 2 20 133 
Claims of Imposition 35 48 88 13 7 191 
Character Attacks 21 12 26 4 8 71 
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  Table 5: Coca-Cola and CCF's Dissimilar Performances 
Pressure Against Coca-Cola Coca-Cola's Response  CCF's Response 
Publication of Ludwig et al. (2001) study 
positively linking childhood obesity to soda 
consumption, and subsequent legislative proposals 
to ban soda from schools 
"As we looked at this situation, we could see the 
pendulum had swung too far in one way [in 
reference to beverage firms aggressively marketing 
to students]," [Coca-Cola CEO Jeffrey Dunn] said. 
"We have to bring it back and get more balance and 
respond to the issues from parents and educators out 
there. We plan to change the flow of this river."  
However, a Lancet editorial observed that "a 
large proportion of the children (in Ludwig's 
study) were obese" to begin with, which the 
Lancet points out, certainly affected the 
study's outcome...The obvious flaws in 
Ludwig's research also earned this response 
from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention: "There are no data from the 
Harvard study that allow us to estimate what 
proportion of obesity might be accounted for 
by changes in soft drink consumption."  
CSPI's "Save Harry Campaign" (2001): Protests 
of Coca-Cola's marketing affiliation with the film 
Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone. The CSPI 
argued that soda is not healthy for children and 
that Coca-Cola should not use films primarily 
targeting youths as a way to market its products. 
"To characterize our sponsorship of the film and our 
promotion of the magic of reading as inappropriate, 
and to infer a connection with health and wellness 
of children, simply misses the point for the sake of 
sensationalism." - Susan McCombs, Coca-Cola 
spokesperson 
[The] CSPI is always the first to whine about 
"marketing campaigns aimed at adolescents." 
Now, in its fervor to frighten consumers out of 
choosing to drink soda, it's running one of its 
own. That's hypocrisy--something Harry 
wouldn't like. 
CSPI calls on the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) to require warning labels on sodas (July 
2005) 
Claim of self-regulation: voluntary stoppage of 
sales of full-calorie carbonated drinks during the 
school day in middle schools. According to Donald 
R. Knauss, president of Coca-Cola North America: 
"These guidelines mark a commitment by the 
industry to provide schools with beverages that 
offer variety, nutrition and fewer calories." (August 
2005) 
When the dietary dictators at the Center for 
Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) called on 
the Food and Drug Administration to require 
warning labels on soda cans, they again 
pushed the envelope to the point of absurdity. 
But as we told The Kansas City Star, "This is 
more of a media stunt than a serious effort to 
get the FDA to act." Thankfully, the media 
appears to be seeing CSPI's radical agenda for 
what it is: laughable.  
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   Table 6: Media Mentions of CCF's Rhetorical Strategies 
Rhetorical Strategy Local Outlets National Outlets 
Claims of Incompetence 6 1 
Claims of Imposition 13 9 
Character Attacks 11 5 	
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Figure 1: No More School Pop Machines 
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Figure 2: The Nutritionists Have, Like, Gone Too Far 
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CHAPTER 4: WHO STAYS AND WHO GOES? FIRMS’ DIVESTMENT DECISIONS IN 
HOST COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS  
  
Abstract  
 
I examine the factors that influence firms’ decisions to divest from or maintain economic ties to 
host countries subject to international sanctions. Extant research on this topic has primarily 
focused on economic factors and the pressures of activists in firms’ home countries. Beyond 
these factors, I argue that firms consider marginalized stakeholders in the host country and 
subnational (e.g., state-level) governments in the home country in divestment decisions. 
Empirically, I analyze the divestment decisions of 199 publicly held U.S. firms operating in 
South Africa during apartheid from 1985 to 1990—a time when the U.S. enacted economic 
sanctions against the country. I find that firms that engaged in the highest levels of corporate 
activism in South Africa maintained economic ties to the country. Conversely, subnational 
governments’ selective purchasing laws (i.e., sanctions) enacted against firms prompted 
divestment.  
 
 
Keywords: Divestment, economic sanctions, stakeholders, activism 
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Introduction 
 
Firms often confront the decision of whether or not they should divest from, or sever their 
economic ties to, host countries subject to international sanctions (Soule, Swaminathan, & 
Tihanyi, 2014). Sanctions represent attempts by national governments to change or stop 
controversial behaviors of another country. Historically, countries such as South Africa and 
Myanmar faced sanctions for governmental repression of marginalized constituents. Today, 
countries such as Iran and Syria confront sanctions for similar human rights violations. Extant 
research on this topic emphasizes the factors that influence firms’ divestment decisions in 
sanctioned host countries. Economic factors such as firms’ commitment to and dependence on 
the sanctioned host country affect the divestment decision (Spar & La Mure, 2003; Rodman, 
1995). More recently, scholars have considered how various stakeholders, such as activists and 
competitors, influence firms’ decisions (Meyer & Thein, 2014; Soule, 2009; Soule et al., 2014).  
 Despite theoretical advancement on this topic, extant research fails to capture the breadth 
of factors that firms consider in their divestment decisions. In particular, firms have cited their 
concern for marginalized employees and communities in sanctioned host countries as a reason 
for non-divestment (e.g., Salpukas, 1997). This concern leads some firms to engage in corporate 
activism, defined as individual and collective actions for the benefit of marginalized stakeholders 
in the host country. Additionally, firms have cited selective purchasing laws enacted by 
subnational (e.g., state-level) governments in their home countries as a factor that prompts 
divestment (e.g., Mintier, 1997). Selective purchasing laws represent financial penalties against 
firms that operate in sanctioned host countries, but desire to also conduct business with 
subnational governments. To date, the role of corporate activism in the host country and selective 
purchasing laws in firms’ home countries remain unaccounted for in extant research.  
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In this paper, I develop and test theory on the importance of these factors in firms’ 
divestment decisions. Specifically, I analyze the divestment decisions of 199 publicly held U.S. 
firms with foreign direct investment (FDI) in South Africa during apartheid—the systematic 
segregation of whites and the non-white majority in South Africa between 1948 and 1994. I 
focus on the time period from 1985 to 1990, when the U.S. enacted and maintained economic 
sanctions against South Africa given the intensification of apartheid (Thomson, 2008). This 
historical case provides a useful context for investigating divestment decisions because archival 
sources offer insight into firms’ engagement with stakeholders in South Africa. Moreover, U.S. 
firms confronted pressure from state-level governments that sought to coerce divestment (Moses, 
1992). The variation in firms’ divestment decisions in South Africa allows for a unique test of 
hypotheses regarding these factors. The results indicate that firms that engaged in the highest 
levels of corporate activism in the host country maintained economic ties to South Africa. 
Conversely, state-level governmental sanctions enacted against firms prompted divestment. 
Overall, this study contributes to divestment research by showing how new factors in the host 
and home countries matter for this decision.   
Theory Development 
 
Sanctioned host countries are often characterized by high political risk, violence, and/or 
repression of marginalized constituents largely due to racial/ethnic and religious differences 
(Rodman, 2001). Research on firms’ divestment decisions in these contexts focuses on the 
factors that influence firms to stay or leave. Factors typically have an economic or stakeholder 
orientation.  
Salient economic factors that firms consider include the opportunity to generate profits in 
the host country, the extent of their commitment to the host country, and their level of 
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international diversification. As evidenced by U.S. sanctions against Nicaragua in the 1980s 
following the rise to power of a revolutionary government, firms often remain in sanctioned host 
countries if there are opportunities to generate profits (Rodman, 1995). This decision follows a 
rational economic actor logic, in that firms will continue operations if financial prospects are 
positive (Benito & Welch, 1997). Additionally, firms with a significant amount of assets invested 
in a host country (i.e., economic commitment) are likely to remain due to sunk costs (Spar & La 
Mure, 2003). Given the difficulty for firms to recoup financial losses, many firms opt for non-
divestment. Similarly, firms that are less internationally diversified are less likely to divest from 
a sanctioned country. Firms may be heavily dependent on sales or operations in the country. For 
example, U.S. firms responded differently to economic sanctions against Libya at a time when 
the host country government supported terrorists groups (Rodman, 1995). Several oil firms 
remained in Libya given that they had fewer alternative sources of oil reserves. Taken together, 
the influence of these economic factors is consistent with research on the antecedents of 
divestment (and non-divestment) more generally (Benito, 2005; McDermott, 2010).  
Beyond economic factors, scholars argue that stakeholders such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), shareholder activists, and competitors influence firms’ divestment 
decisions. NGOs, in particular, use protests and boycotts to damage firms’ reputations and 
reduce their profitability (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Meyer & Thein, 
2014). As evidenced by PepsiCo’s divestment from Myanmar following a boycott of the firm’s 
products, NGOs often target firms with good reputations and coerce their divestment (Soule et 
al., 2014). Media attention to NGOs’ pressures also prompts firms’ divestment (Spar, 1998). 
Shareholder activists also influence firms’ decisions via submissions of shareholder proposals. 
These proposals often result in public debates at firms’ annual shareholder meetings about the 
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presence of firms in sanctioned host countries (Graves, Rehbein, & Waddock, 2001). 
Additionally, firms consider the divestment decisions of their peers and may mimic their 
behavior (Soule et al., 2014). 
Beyond the aforementioned factors, I argue that two factors have been overlooked in 
research on divestment decisions in sanctioned host countries—corporate activism in the host 
country and subnational governments’ selective purchasing laws in firms’ home countries. I 
develop hypotheses regarding the importance of these factors below.  
Corporate Activism in the Sanctioned Host Country 
 
Firms often engage in corporate activism for the benefit of marginalized stakeholders in 
sanctioned host countries. I define marginalized stakeholders as individuals and groups from 
racial/ethnic or religious backgrounds that confront governmental repression, discrimination, and 
censorship. In many cases, marginalized stakeholders are minorities in a country, although there 
are exceptions (e.g., nonwhite individuals in South Africa during apartheid comprised the 
majority of the population). Although there are several types of stakeholders that are 
marginalized in sanctioned countries, I argue that employees and communities are most relevant 
in firms’ divestment decisions. 
 The social movements literature serves a useful starting point for building logic that links 
firms’ concern for marginalized stakeholders to firms’ decisions to remain in a host country. 
Social movement theory emphasizes individuals, groups, and/or organizations’ goal of creating 
social change (King, 2008b). Activism, or actions designed to produce a desired social change, is 
central to social movement theory. Activists mobilize resources and engage in individual or 
collective action to achieve their goals. Although most conceptualizations of activism center on 
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NGOs putting pressure on firms or governments (e.g., Soule, 2012b), firms can engage in 
activism when they desire to see a social change by a government.  
 When operating in sanctioned host countries, firms can engage in activism by promoting 
the well-being of marginalized employees and communities. This often entails improving the 
wages of marginalized employees and training them to move into better positions in the 
workplace (e.g., Morgan, 2006). In addition to employees, firms may provide philanthropic 
donations to the communities in which these employees reside for the benefit of other 
individuals. Some firms create educational initiatives for individuals from these communities so 
as to improve their employment opportunities (Malone & Roberts, 1994). These actions 
represent a form of corporate activism, as they are a response to the host government’s 
repression of these stakeholders. Executives maintain the belief that corporate activism is the 
best way to coerce host governments to change (Malone & Roberts, 1994). 
Firms vary in their engagement in corporate activism in sanctioned host countries. I 
assume that as firms increase their engagement in activism, they foster deeply entrenched beliefs 
that non-divestment is the best option. This logic leads to the following hypothesis:  
H1: Firms with higher levels of corporate activism in a sanctioned host country are less 
likely to divest.  
 
Selective Purchasing Laws in the Home Country 
 
Scholars show that subnational (e.g., state-level) governments enact legislation that aligns with 
activists’ pressures against firms (e.g., Reid & Toffel, 2009). In the context of divestment, 
subnational governments enact selective purchasing laws as a means to pressure firms to divest 
from sanctioned countries. A selective purchasing law is a form of legislation that penalizes 
firms that operate in a sanctioned host country but also desire to conduct business with a 
subnational government (IRRC, 1997). Firms that opt to remain in the host country confront 
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penalties ranging from an additional five to ten percent “tax” when making a bid for local 
business contracts to outright bans from making a bid (Guay, 2000). Selective purchasing laws 
are different from federal economic sanctions against a host country, in that selective purchasing 
laws intentionally give business preference to firms that do not operate in the host country in 
question. Federal economic sanctions, however, typically affect all firms (e.g., bans on new 
investment into a host country apply to all firms).  
 Selective purchasing laws represent political consumerism, or activism that seeks to 
change the behavior of MNEs by exacting economic costs via boycotts of corporate products and 
services (Micheletti, Follesdal, & Stolle, 2003). Individual consumers use their purchasing power 
to boycott MNEs associated with unethical or controversial practices abroad, including 
operations in countries rife with human rights abuses (Carrigan & Attala, 2001). Alternatively, 
individuals participate in “buycotts,” or intentional purchases of goods and services from MNEs 
engaged in socially acceptable behaviors relative to their corporate peers (Creyer & Ross, 1997; 
den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). Like individuals, subnational governments punish MNEs linked 
to repressive host governments involved in human rights abuses against local constituents. 
 Selective purchasing laws present firms with an economic dilemma. An additional tax 
penalty increases the costs to procure business with a subnational government and decreases a 
firm’s potential profitability in the local market (Buckley, Pass, & Prescott, 1988). Outright bans 
from making a bid, more stringently, eliminate firms from potentially lucrative markets as 
subnational governments have procurement budgets upwards of millions of dollars each year 
(Fry, 1998). Selective purchasing laws force firms to weigh the divestment decision as a choice 
between the economic opportunities in a local market and a sanctioned host country. Firms, with 
headquarters in a local market, in particular, are vulnerable to selective purchasing laws as much 
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of their domestic business may be concentrated locally. Thus, firms are more likely to divest 
from a sanctioned host country in order to reduce the potential economic loss attached to 
selective purchasing laws. In essence, firms are likely to acquiesce to subnational governments’ 
activism. This logic leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Firms that are headquartered in states that have enacted selective purchasing laws are 
more likely to divest.  
 
Context  
 
I test these hypotheses in the context of firms’ divestment decisions near the end of apartheid in 
South Africa. Between 1948 and 1994, apartheid—the systematic legal segregation of whites and 
the nonwhite majority—was law in South Africa. The ruling National Party (NP) instituted the 
system of apartheid based on a belief of racial superiority of White South Africans relative to 
Black, Colored, and Indian South Africans (Thompson, 2000). Apartheid resulted in more than 
100 laws that restricted the economic and political rights of the nonwhite majority, including 
where individuals could live and work as well as whom they could marry. It also resulted in the 
censorship, unlawful detention, and murder of nonwhite South Africans, as evidenced by the 
Sharpville Massacre in 1960 (Field, 2010). 
 In addition to calling for the National Party to change its laws, anti-apartheid activists 
pressured firms to divest from South Africa. Activists argued that the taxes firms paid to the 
South African government acted as an indirect form of support for or complicity with apartheid 
(Soule, 2012b). Although activists targeted firms worldwide to divest, U.S. firms confronted the 
most pressure primarily because of the parallels between the civil rights movement in the 1950s 
and 60s and the issue of racial inequality in South Africa (Field, 2010).  
 Although most firms adopted a wait-and-see approach through the mid-1970s, the media 
attention to and criticism of a new wave of violence in South Africa beginning in 1976 forced 
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firms to justify their decisions to remain in the country. In response to this attention and 
criticism, many US firms adopted the Sullivan Principles—a code of conduct designed to 
promote the advancement and training of nonwhite employees as well as the development of 
communities. Corporate executives perceived that adherence to this code of conduct gave firms a 
license to operate in South Africa because it represented a symbol of firms’ commitment to 
marginalized stakeholders in the country (Field, 2010).  
 Despite this corporate initiative, the U.S. government enacted economic sanctions against 
South Africa in 1985 following the implementation of a state of emergency in the country, which 
entailed an intensification of violence against nonwhite constituents. In 1986, Congress 
strengthened sanctions against South Africa by passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. 
This act entailed a ban on new firm-level investment into South Africa (Thomson, 2008). At the 
same time, state-level governments enacted selective purchasing laws to pressure firms to divest 
from South Africa (Moses, 1992).  
Although firms confronted pressures to divest over the previous decade, these pressures 
were most salient in the mid-1980s. The time period beginning in 1985 was characterized as a 
“mass exodus” (Field, 2010), as firms began to divest from South Africa. Several firms, such as 
Dell Computer Corp., acknowledged that selective purchasing laws led to their divestment from 
the country (IRRC, 1991). Despite the divestment of their peers, however, many firms opted to 
maintain economic ties to South Africa. Firms, such as General Motors and Mobil Oil Corp., 
switched to licensing relationships as a way to reduce but maintain an economic presence in the 
country (IRRC, 1991). Other firms continued to maintain FDI in the country. By 1991, 
divestment essentially came to a halt as the US lifted economic sanctions against South Africa.  
Data and Method 
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Sample 
 
I began with an initial sample of 214 publicly held firms with FDI in South Africa between 1985 
and 1990, but 15 firms were acquired during the time period. Thus, they were not included in the 
dataset, resulting in a final sample of 199 publicly held firms. I focus solely on firms with FDI in 
South Africa for two reasons. First, this focus allows for a more nuanced understanding of firms’ 
options, as divestment decisions in sanctioned host countries are not a 0 vs. 1 choice. Rather, 
firms often switch to licensing agreements in lieu of divestment (Meyer & Thein, 2014). I am 
able to track these nuanced decisions with an examination of firms that had FDI in the country. 
Second, at the beginning of the time period, selective purchasing laws solely affected firms with 
FDI in South Africa (Moses, 1992).  
Dependent Variable 
 
Data on a firm’s divestment decision come from annual publications of the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) regarding firms’ investment in South Africa. It is a 
trichotomous dependent variable coded as 0 for non-divestment, 1 for switching to a license 
agreement, and 2 for complete divestment, in a given year.   
Independent Variables 
I coded corporate activism using firms’ ratings on their application of the Sullivan Principles. 
This variable was coded as 3 (making good progress), 2 (making progress), 1 (needs to be more 
active), or 0 (new signatory or non-signatory), in a given year. The categories and data on firms’ 
ratings come from the Reports on the Signatory Companies to the Sullivan Principles, published 
annually by Arthur D. Little, Inc.18 Firms were rated on a scale of 0 to 20 points in three areas, 
for a maximum of 60 points: (1) education for non-employees (e.g., philanthropic contributions 
to educational programs that benefited nonwhite individuals); (2) training and advancement of 																																																								
18 New signatories were given a rating of 0 as their progress had yet to be evaluated. 
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nonwhite employees in each subsidiary; and (3) community development (e.g., philanthropic 
contributions to programs that benefited nonwhite individuals in business, housing, health, 
welfare, and recreation).19 To make equitable comparisons among firms of different sizes, the 
ratings were based on ratios of a specific factor to be evaluated (e.g., number of nonwhite 
employees trained) to a measure reported by the firm (e.g., total number of employees).  
Data on selective purchasing laws come from A Guide to American State and Local 
Laws on South Africa (Moses, 1992). I coded this variable as 1 if a firm was headquartered in a 
state that enacted or maintained a selective purchasing law, 0 otherwise. During the time period, 
5 states enacted selective purchasing laws.  
Control Variables 
 
I include several control variables to rule out alternative explanations. Firm size is measured by 
the yearly logarithm of total assets. Larger firms are more likely to divest operations given that 
they are typically less dependent on one particular country (Benito, 1997). Firm performance is 
measured by the yearly return on assets (ROA). Firms that are performing poorly are more likely 
to divest operations as a way to restructure their global portfolios. Data for firm size and 
performance come from Compustat and, when necessary, Fortune magazine’s listing of the 
largest 500 firms in the US. International diversification is measured as the count of country-
level operations that a firm has besides the U.S. and South Africa. This measure follows Hitt, 
Hoskisson, and Kim’s (1997) definition of international diversification—“the number of 
different markets in which it [the firm] operates and their importance to the firm (as measured, 
for instance, by the percentage of total sales represented by each market)” (767).20 Data on firms’ 
country-level operations come from the Directory of American Firms Operating in Foreign 																																																								
19 Unfortunately, the reports do not provide the specific quantitative ratings for each firm. 
20 Given the availability of data, I focus on the number of country-level operations in the main analysis. A 
robustness check (later in the essay) offers insight into a firm’s dependence on South Africa, as measured by sales.  
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Countries. This semi-annual publication represents the best publicly available source for data on 
U.S. business abroad during the time period of study. A firm’s economic commitment to South 
Africa is measured by the number of subsidiaries a firm had in South Africa in a given year, 
under the assumption that more subsidiaries equates to a higher level of commitment. These data 
come from the IRRC volumes.  
To measure a firm’s reputational standing, I used Fortune magazine’s annual “Most 
Admired Companies” index. Firms are ranked on a scale of 0 to 10 based on the perceptions of 
executives from peer firms and industry analysts. Reputational standing is coded as a firm’s raw 
score, in a given year. Firms that are not listed in this index are given a score of 0, following 
extant research (McDonnell & King, 2013).  
 I capture the influence of various stakeholders as follows. Shareholder activism is coded 
as 1 when a firm’s shareholders submitted a resolution that called for the firm to divest from 
South Africa in a given year, 0 otherwise. Each year, the IRRC published a set of volumes (How 
Institutions Voted on Social Responsibility Shareholder Resolutions) that detailed all shareholder 
resolutions related to salient social issues confronting firms. During this time period, apartheid 
was the most salient social issue. To measure NGO activism, I searched LexisNexis and Proquest 
for all media mentions of NGO-sponsored protests and boycotts against firms operating in South 
Africa. I coded this variable as 1 if a firm was targeted by an NGO in a given year, 0 otherwise. 
Newspapers have become a reliable source to determine the extent of NGO pressures against 
firms (e.g., King, 2008a; McDonnell & King, 2013; Soule et al., 2014). Competitors’ decisions 
to divest is measured as the count of industry-level domestic and foreign competitors that 
divested from South Africa in a given year. Competitors’ decisions to switch is measured in the 
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same manner. Data for both variables come from the IRRC’s annual publications of firms’ 
investment in South Africa.  
Finally, I add industry and year fixed effects. Industry fixed effects capture differences 
across industries, particularly with respect to the likelihood of divestment (Meyer & Thein, 
2014). Year fixed effects capture macro-level changes in both South Africa and the US (e.g., 
enactment of a state of emergency, intensification of US sanctions against South Africa). With 
the exception of the fixed effects, all independent and control variables are lagged by one year.  
Analysis  
 
I use ordinal logistic regression for panel data in this study. This method is appropriate given that 
there is an a priori ordering of the divestment outcomes (O’Connell, 2006). Specifically, the 
divestment outcomes can be ranked in terms of economic presence in South Africa.  
Results  
 
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix of the variables. Tables 8 and 9 
present the main results and marginal effects of the independent variables, respectively. To 
begin, there are noteworthy findings among the control variables (Model 1 of Table 8). Firms 
with higher levels of economic commitment to South Africa were significantly more likely to 
stay in the country, as argued by others (e.g., Spar & La Mure, 2003). Surprisingly, I do not find 
support for direct NGO activism or shareholder activism influencing divestment, as argued by 
others (Soule, 2009). Similarly, I do not find support for the argument that firms with the best 
reputations will divest from sanctioned host countries (Meyer & Thein, 2014).  
 H1 argues that firms with higher levels of corporate activism in the host country are less 
likely to divest. According to Model 2 of Table 8, there is empirical support for this hypothesis. 
Negative coefficients in ordinal logistic models correspond to lower levels of an outcome—in 
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this case, non-divestment. A marginal effects analysis (Table 9) shows that a one-unit increase in 
a firm’s rating on the Sullivan Principles is associated with a 2.8% percent increase in the 
likelihood of non-divestment.  
 H2 argues that firms headquartered in states that enact selective purchasing laws are more 
likely to divest. According to Model 3 of Table 8, there is some empirical for this hypothesis. A 
marginal effects analysis (Table 9) shows that a firm is 6.0% more likely to divest if it is 
headquartered in a state that has enacted a selective purchasing law. This finding lends support to 
scholars who argue that subnational governments affect firm-level decisions (Reid & Toffel, 
2009).  
Robustness checks 
I conducted several robustness checks on the results from the ordinal logistical regression 
models. Specifically, data limitations regarding industry growth/decline in South Africa and the 
size of firms’ nonwhite workforce reduce the sample size. However, these factors may influence 
the divestment decision. First, I assume that if an industry in the host country is growing, firms 
will be more likely to stay even in the midst of international sanctions. The United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) maintains data on the growth or decline of 
manufacturing industries (as measured by output). Industries such as financial institutions, retail 
& trade, and services are excluded. Despite this limitation, the main findings remain consistent 
with the inclusion of industry growth/decline as a control variable (see Table 10). I do note that 
the effect of corporate activism in the host country is slightly weakened, whereas the effect of 
selective purchasing laws is strengthened. Second, firms with more nonwhite employees may 
have been more inclined to stay in South Africa relative to firms with fewer nonwhite 
employees. The IRRC volumes did not include all employee data (e.g., number of nonwhite 
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employees), as US firms voluntarily provided this information. The statistical effects of the 
independent variables, however, remain consistent when the count of nonwhite employees is 
included in the analysis (see Table 11). The main findings also remain consistent when both 
control variables are included in the analysis.21  
 Beyond adding control variables to the analysis, several control variables can be 
measured in multiple ways. First, firm performance can be measured as the yearly return on 
equity (ROE). Second, an alternative measure of international diversification is the ratio of host 
country sales to total sales. This ratio accounts for the relative economic importance of a host 
country to a firm (Hitt et al., 1997). The IRRC provided South African sales data for many firms. 
Third, economic commitment can be measured as the amount of assets a firm has in a host 
country (Spar & La Mure, 2003). Table 12 includes these alternative measures in the analysis. 
Interestingly, firm performance and economic commitment are no longer statistically significant 
factors that influence firms to stay. However, firms with higher levels of economic dependence 
on South Africa were significantly more likely to stay in the country. When the three alternative 
measures are included in the analysis, the main findings remain consistent. In fact, the effect of 
corporate activism is strengthened.  
As an additional robustness check for alternative measures, I substituted a firm’s brand 
orientation for its reputation score. This measure is more closely aligned with the assumption 
that activists target firms with strong brand orientations (Meyer & Thein, 2014). Using data from 
Compustat, I measured brand orientation as the ratio of advertising expenses to total expenses. 
The inclusion of this variable reduced the sample to 80 firms (406 observations), but the main 
findings remained consistent.  
Post-hoc Analysis 																																																								
21 The inclusion of both control variables reduces the same to 132 firms and 660 observations.  
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It is important to note that firms may not only be affected by selective purchasing laws in their 
headquarters, but in other states as well (e.g., Mintier, 1997). My a priori assumption is that firms 
that confront bans in multiple states will be more likely to divest relative to firms that confront 
bans solely in the state of headquarters and firms that do not face bans at all. This assumption 
stems from the logic that firms that confront more activism are more likely to acquiesce (King, 
2008b). I obtained data on firms’ operations across states from the Directory of Corporate 
Affiliations. I coded the variable cumulative selective purchasing laws as the count of states that 
enacted laws that would affect a firm’s operations. Table 13 shows that there is no empirical 
support for this assumption.  
Discussion  
 
This paper has addressed the question ‘why do some firms divest from sanctioned host countries 
while other firms maintain economic ties?’ I argued that firms’ corporate activism in the host 
country and selective purchasing laws in firms’ home countries can influence the divestment 
decision. Using the context of apartheid in South Africa, I find that firms with the highest levels 
corporate activism were less likely to divest from South Africa. Firms maintained a strong belief 
that taking care of employees and communities was one way to create social change; thus, some 
firms opted for non-divestment. Conversely, selective purchasing laws prompted firms to divest. 
Some firms were more willing to choose business with the subnational government and ended up 
divesting from South Africa. 
 This study is not without its limitations. In particular, data limitations leave room for 
alternative explanations that are not captured in this study. For example, I am unable to analyze 
subsidiaries’ financial performance as a factor in firms’ divestment decisions despite its 
importance in divestment research (Berry, 2013). However, as others have noted, obtaining data 
	 76 
related to divestment decisions is difficult given firms’ lack of transparency on subsidiary 
operations (McDermott, 2010; Soule et al., 2014). I attempted to compensate for a lack of 
financial performance data at the subsidiary level by including a measure of industry 
growth/decline in the robustness checks. The output of an industry may offer some insight into 
whether remaining in South Africa was a profitable endeavor. Additionally, it is difficult to 
capture firms’ future orientation (i.e., assumptions that apartheid would end in the near future). 
This orientation may have influenced firms’ divestment decisions. Finally, I acknowledge that 
employees and communities are actors with agency (e.g., Marquis & Battilana, 2009). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that employees at Polaroid desired for the firm to stay in South Africa in the 
early 1970s (Morgan, 2006). However, data are not available to determine the extent to which 
marginalized stakeholders pressured firms to remain in or divest from the country. 
Despite these limitations, this study has implications for research on firms’ divestment 
decisions in sanctioned host countries. First, scholars have become more concerned about home 
country factors in coercing divestment (Soule, 2009; Soule et al., 2014). This study adds another 
home country factor—selective purchasing laws—as being able to coerce divestment. Less, 
however, is known about host country factors beyond the role of governments’ expropriation of 
firms’ operations (e.g., Kobrin, 1980). This study highlights the importance of marginalized 
stakeholders as a relevant group that firms consider in their decisions—to the extent of 
prompting firms to remain in the host country. Second, and surprisingly, I did not find support 
for arguments that pressure from NGOs, shareholder activists, and competitors coerced 
divestment (Graves et al., 2001; Soule et al., 2014). Subnational governments had a more salient 
role in coercing divestment relative to these stakeholders in this context.  
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Although this study utilizes an historical context, the findings are relevant for other host 
countries subject to international sanctions. Firms with FDI in these contexts often make 
considerations for employees from marginalized backgrounds, as evidenced by Unocal’s 
workplace initiatives despite activists’ pressures for the firm to divest from Myanmar (Salpukas, 
1997). Additionally, selective purchasing laws still represent an important mechanism of 
subnational governments. For example, media reports claimed that selective purchasing laws had 
a significant role in pressuring firms such as Apple Computers Inc. to divest from Burma when a 
military regime maintained power in the country (Mintier, 1997). More recently, states in the 
U.S. have enacted selective purchasing laws to discourage firms from conducting business in 
Iran given the country’s association with terrorism (UANI, 2017). This form of activism may be 
influential in coercing firms to divest from countries rife with human rights abuses. 
 This study opens an avenue for future research on this topic. First, in light of the current 
selective purchasing laws enacted against Iran, researchers have a unique opportunity to discuss 
divestment decisions not only with managers, but also with legislators who enact such policies. 
Such an inquiry can offer insight into the processes behind divestment decisions. Questions 
remain as to whether and how firms affect the legislative processes for selective purchasing laws. 
Second, researchers can interview executives to better understand corporate activism in 
sanctioned host countries. How do host country governments, employees, and communities 
perceive corporate activism? How effective is corporate activism in changing the well-being of 
marginalized stakeholders and, more broadly, encouraging host country governments to change 
their behaviors? These questions, among others, represent plausible research directions. 
Conclusion 
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Although there is a prevalence of sanctioned host countries in which firms operate, firms’ 
divestment decisions in these contexts remains an underexplored avenue of research. Rather than 
simple economic calculations, divestment entails the consideration of various factors in firms’ 
home and host countries. This essay offers two new factors that are important and serves as a 
foundation for future research on this topic.   
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Tables 
  Table 7: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Firm's size 21.121 1.755 1.000           
2. Firm's performance 4.985 7.600 0.013 1.000          
3. International 
diversification 19.338 16.046 0.550 0.002 1.000         
4. Economic 
commitment 1.058 0.880 0.133 -0.060 0.164 1.000        
5. Reputation score 2.249 3.149 0.657 0.138 0.462 0.067 1.000       
6. Shareholder 
activism 0.124 0.330 0.336 0.108 0.216 0.113 0.305 1.000      
7.  NGO activism 0.012 0.107 0.08 -0.078 0.032 0.034 0.039 0.042 1.000     
8. Competitors' 
divestment 1.997 2.269 0.019 -0.040 0.004 -0.128 -0.005 0.177 0.006 1.000    
9. Competitors' 
switching 1.642 2.062 -0.038 -0.015 -0.021 -0.107 0.005 0.148 0.045 0.258 1.000   
10. Corporate activism 0.701 1.121 0.327 0.102 0.385 0.379 0.370 0.297 0.086 0.018 0.086 1.000  
11. Selective 
purchasing laws 0.038 0.191 0.050 -0.016 -0.020 -0.079 -0.021 0.034 0.043 0.131 0.100 -0.019 1.000 
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   Table 8: Main Results 
  Model 1 (Controls) Model 2 Model 3 
Model 4 
(Full) 
Firm's size 0.562** 0.566** 0.554** 0.559** 
 
(0.191) (0.179) (0.192) (0.181) 
Firm's performance -0.029† -0.027 -0.029† -0.273 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
International diversification -0.013 -0.008 -0.013 -0.008 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Economic commitment -0.721*** -0.651*** -0.716*** -0.650*** 
 
(0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176) 
Reputation score -0.065 -0.045 -0.066 -0.046 
 
(0.068) (0.066) (0.069) (0.066) 
Shareholder activism -0.186 -0.272 -0.170 -0.251 
 
(0.367) (0.362) (0.369) (0.363) 
NGO activism 0.064 0.285 -0.050 0.172 
 
(0.657) (0.659) (0.662) (0.664) 
Competitors' divestment 0.037 0.029 0.034 0.026 
 
(0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) 
Competitors' switching -0.027 -0.028 -0.033 -0.034 
 
(0.069) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) 
Corporate activism 
 
-0.281* 
 
-0.268† 
  
(0.140) 
 
(0.142) 
Selective purchasing laws 
  
1.370† 1.234† 
   
(0.721) (0.668) 
/cut1 12.495** 12.798** 12.377** 12.667** 
 
(4.299) (3.995) (4.340) (4.045) 
/cut2 8.342† 8.721* 8.206† 8.570* 
 
(4.280) (3.973) (4.320) (4.023) 
Firms 199 199 199 199 
Observations 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi-square 148.73*** 157.16*** 147.53*** 155.55*** 
Standard errors are in parentheses. † p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 81 
   Table 9: Marginal Effects 
Variable Corresponds To Outcome Marg. Effect 
Corporate activism Model 2 of Table 8 
Divest -0.012* 
 (0.006) 
Switch -0.016† 
 
(0.009) 
Non-divestment 0.028† 
  (0.015) 
Selective purchasing laws  Model 3 of Table 8 
Divest 0.060† 
 
(0.032) 
Switch 0.069† 
 
(0.036) 
Non-divestment -0.129† 
  (0.066) 
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   Table 10: Robustness Check (South African Industry Growth) 
Variable Model 1 (Controls) Model 2 Model 3 
Model 4 
(Full) 
Firm's size 0.673** 0.656** 0.661** 0.647** 
 
(0.228) (0.212) (0.234) (0.219) 
Firm's performance -0.034† -0.033† -0.034† -0.034† 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
International diversification -0.007 0.000 -0.007 -0.001 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Economic commitment -0.751*** -0.678*** -0.744*** -0.675*** 
 
(0.190) (0.190) (0.189) (0.190) 
Reputation score -0.093 -0.071 -0.093 -0.072 
 
(0.075) (0.072) (0.077) (0.075) 
Shareholder activism -0.593 -0.674 -0.587 -0.660 
 
(0.418) (0.410) (0.424) (0.417) 
NGO activism 0.333 -0.581 0.210 0.453 
 
(0.798) (0.796) (0.808) (0.809) 
Competitors' divestment -0.025 -0.033 -0.028 -0.036 
 
(0.083) (0.081) (0.084) (0.083) 
Competitors' switching -0.037 -0.045 -0.037 -0.045 
 
(0.085) (0.083) (0.086) (0.085) 
Industry growth -0.004 -0.003 -0.010 -0.008 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.886) (0.012) 
Corporate activism 
 
-0.307† 
 
-0.285† 
  
(0.158) 
 
(0.162) 
Selective purchasing laws 
  
2.325** 2.124* 
   
(0.886) (0.844) 
/cut1 14.757** 14.639** 14.520** 14.458** 
 
(5.016) (4.626) (5.152) (4.789) 
/cut2 10.278* 10.253* 9.983† 10.009* 
 
(4.981) (4.586) (5.118) (4.752) 
Firms 163 163 163 163 
Observations 856 856 856 856 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi-square 123.82*** 132.31*** 121.40*** 128.65*** 
Standard errors are in parentheses. † p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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   Table 11: Robustness Check (Nonwhite South African Employees) 
Variable Model 1 (Controls) Model 2 Model 3 
Model 4 
(Full) 
Firm's size 0.621* 0.604** 0.604* 0.591** 
 
(0.243) (0.221) (0.247) (0.225) 
Firm's performance -0.014 -0.012 -0.016 -0.013 
 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
International diversification -0.007 0.001 -0.006 0.001 
 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) 
Economic commitment -1.083*** -0.935*** -1.102*** -0.958*** 
 
(0.229) (0.228) (0.231) (0.230) 
Reputation score -0.130 -0.102 -0.133 -0.105 
 
(0.093) (0.087) (0.094) (0.088) 
Shareholder activism -0.262 -0.357 -0.238 -0.328 
 
(0.444) (0.429) (0.448) (0.434) 
NGO activism 0.286 0.574 0.105 0.399 
 
(0.770) (0.760) (0.778) (0.771) 
Competitors' divestment 0.072 0.065 0.072 0.064 
 
(0.092) (0.089) (0.093) (0.089) 
Competitors' switching 0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.004 
 
(0.091) (0.088) (0.091) (0.089) 
Nonwhite employees 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Corporate activism 
 
-0.424* 
 
-0.406* 
  
(0.169) 
 
(0.172) 
Selective purchasing laws 
  
1.989* 1.714† 
   
(0.955) (0.892) 
/cut1 14.866** 14.766** 14.544** 14.497** 
 
(5.319) (4.807) (5.417) (4.912) 
/cut2 9.099† 9.137† 8.699 8.791† 
 
(5.277) (4.756) (5.375) (4.864) 
Firms 156 156 156 156 
Observations 771 771 771 771 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi-square 107.87*** 120.69*** 106.52*** 118.35*** 
Standard errors are in parentheses. † p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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    Table 12: Robustness Check  (Alternative Measures) 
Variable Model 1 (Controls) Model 2 Model 3 
Model 4 
(Full) 
Firm's size 0.264 0.292 0.262 0.293 
 
(0.233) (0.203) (0.235) (0.205) 
ROE 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
South African Sales/Total Sales -1.147*** -1.041*** -1.190*** -1.080*** 
 
(0.298) (0.284) (0.230) (0.287) 
South African assets  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reputation score -0.142 -0.098 -0.156† -0.110 
 
(0.088) (0.080) (0.089) (0.081) 
Shareholder activism -0.579 -0.691 -0.578 -0.685 
 
(0.452) (0.431) (0.453) (0.432) 
NGO activism 0.908 1.262 0.762 1.129 
 
(0.902) (0.087) (0.910) (0.881) 
Competitors' divestment 0.021 0.017 0.024 0.021 
 
(0.089) (0.086) (0.089) (0.086) 
Competitors' switching 0.020 0.026 0.018 0.026 
 
(0.091) (0.088) (0.091) (0.089) 
Corporate activism 
 
-0.474** 
 
-0.470** 
  
(0.159) 
 
(0.161) 
Selective purchasing laws 
  
2.470* 2.139* 
   
(1.007) (0.895) 
/cut1 6.962 7.927† 6.838 7.862† 
 
(5.452) (4.689) (5.478) (4.729) 
/cut2 1.727 2.897 1.561 2.789 
 
(5.428) (4.653) (5.454) (4.693) 
Firms 139 139 139 139 
Observations 673 673 673 673 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi-square 106.53*** 127.12*** 106.56*** 126.55*** 
Standard errors are in parentheses. † p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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      Table 13: Post-hoc Analysis 
Variable Model 
Firm's size 0.533** 	 (0.205) Firm's performance -0.025 	 (0.018) International diversification -0.014 	 (0.015) Economic commitment -0.735*** 	 (0.201) Reputation score -0.082 	 (0.071) Shareholder activism -0.276 	 (0.536) NGO activism 0.054 	 (0.673) Competitors' divestment 0.037 	 (0.071) Competitors' switching -0.020 	 (0.072) Selective purchasing laws (cumulative) 0.340 	 (0.331) /cut1 7.641 	 (5.025) /cut2 11.888* 	 (5.036) Firms 184 
Observations 927 
Industry dummy Yes 
Year dummy Yes 
Chi-square 137.48*** 
Standard errors are in parentheses. † p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I set out to answer two central research questions: (1) how do firms defend 
themselves when targeted by social movement activists? and (2) why do firms respond 
differently to activists’ demands? With regard to the first question, I focused on firms’ negative 
rhetoric aimed at delegitimizing activists. In particular, I found that defamation (both overt and 
covert) is a plausible strategy in firms “defensive repertoire” (McDonnell & King, 2013). Given 
the dearth of research on defamation (Bolino et al., 2008), this dissertation lays a foundation for 
future research into this rhetorical strategy. There is room for comparative case studies on this 
topic given the prevalence of front groups in society and uncovering of ties between these 
organizations and firms (SourceWatch, 2013). Furthermore, front groups are not just a U.S. 
phenomenon. Thus, it would be interesting to compare the defamation tactics of front groups in 
the U.S. to front groups in other countries.  
 With regard to the second question, in Essay 3, I examined two relevant factors that 
influence differences in firms’ responses to activists’ demands for divestment from sanctioned 
host countries. Specifically, firms’ commitment to marginalized stakeholders in the host country 
and subnational governments’ selective purchasing laws matter for the divestment decision. 
Although I use the historical context of apartheid in South Africa, the findings in this study are 
relevant for ongoing divestment debates. Organizations such as United Against Nuclear Iran 
(UANI) pressure firms to divest from sanctioned host countries. Similarly, subnational 
governments have enacted legislation in an effort to influences firms’ decisions (UANI, 2017). 
The divestment decision, however, is complex. In order to better understand this complexity, 
future research on this topic can include interviews with corporate executives involved in these 
decisions. This methodological approach would follow early research on firms’ divestment 
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decisions and help scholars better understand the nuances of the decision ((McDermott, 2010; 
Van de Ven, 2007). 
 Research on corporate responses to social movement activism remains in its infancy 
(Briscoe & Gupta, 2016). It is my hope that this dissertation prompts future research on this 
topic. Given the plethora of social issues that are of concern to both firms and activists, this topic 
will remain salient to both practitioners and scholars alike.  
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